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The Limpopo Legislature was instituted as one of the nine provincial legislatures of democratic South Africa in 1994.  This provincial institution was mandated by the Constitution of 1993 and 1996 to provide for the mechanisms to ensure that provincial executive state organs would be accountable to it. In addition, it was to maintain oversight over the executive in the province.
In keeping with these constitutional provisions, Limpopo Legislature, during the period 1994-2009, had embarked on a number of study tours as one of the mechanisms to enrich its capacity on the oversight function. Oversight as a function is meant to monitor policy implementation by the executive or the provincial government departments. The executive continuously performed poorly despite the fact that the oversight function was conducted and study tours undertaken.
There have been different concerns about the undertaking of study tours by Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs) and the impact of these tours (Memorandum on policy proposal on study tour, April 08, 2005; Undated minutes of Chairpersons of Committees). On the former, a concern was that members should limit the number of study tours and instead visit one country to learn about issues affecting their respective committees in the Legislature. This was informed by the fact that members serve in different committees and as such are expected to have interest in those committees’ mandates. Hence, there was the concurrent need to focus on different issues raised in different committees when members are on study tours. On the impact of such study tours, a concern was the implementation of the lessons from study tours (Minutes of Committee Sectional Meeting, March 19, 2007), which appeared to be limited.
 In essence, the oversight function is a way in which the members of the Legislature monitor the administration and effectiveness of the programmes that have been enacted into law. Maseko (1998) maintains that legislature committee members would then require the executive officials to present or produce documents formally or informally regarding progress and problems associated with programmes being reviewed. This would therefore require members to scrutinise such documents, engage the executive officials on the findings, and make recommendations where necessary. 
This study therefore seeks to find out more about the contribution that study tours had on the oversight function during the third term of the Limpopo Legislature (2004-2009). Furthermore, the study strives to determine whether such a contribution had an impact on the effectiveness of oversight and the reasons thereof.
1.2.      BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
      Mismanagement, qualified reports, and poor performance seem to be persisting in         Limpopo Provincial government departments despite the constitutional provisions for the existence of the Portfolio and Standing Committees (Auditor-General’s reports; Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA)’ reports; Committee reports, 1994-2008)
Despite the media exposing the above executive malfunctioning (Matlala, 2009; Makhado, 2007; Maponya, 2008; Mosoma, daily), Mafunisa, who conducted a case study in Limpopo Province (Mafunisa,2007:261), indicated that 
common types of corruption cases that are prevalent in Limpopo Province include the theft of assets, the mismanagement of funds, unauthorized deductions, irregular appointment/promotions, the irregular awarding of tenders, corruption, irregular sale of assets, non-compliance with service delivery standards amongst others. 
During the first legislature; i.e., from 1994-1999, oversight was minimally understood and thus, minimally conducted. According to committee members, it was felt and even suggested in the House that the committees should form part of budgetary planning for the department (Hansard of the Legislature of Northern Province, 1997:98). This is what Ron Irwin  (Parliamentary Centre, 2001:3) referred to as “the committee system that is the extension of question period, which is really the ill-intentioned conversing with the ill-informed”. Further,  it was an opportunity for committee members to build experience and evidence on how committees should be restructured, particularly for an oversight function, which is investigatory in nature. Assumedly, the first term of the legislature was associated with misunderstandings on how committee system works; i.e., what their actual mandates were. Maybe these misunderstandings led to a point where the committee members saw a need to be more organized, hence the different types of committees with specific mandates. Study tours were hopefully undertaken during this period, which essentially represented a learning curve.  Therefore, the researcher went  through the institutional archives to search documents regarding this information.
During the second legislature; i.e., from 2000-2004, there was a shift in the way oversight was understood and conducted. Mike Forrestall (Parliamentary Centre, 2001) concluded that whatever innovations committee members try in the committee system have to enhance the system, enrich the capacity of committee members to contribute to policy development and legislation and promote better and wider constituent awareness of policy and legislation, but it has to be done slowly. Even during the term, study tours were undertaken as a means to enhance committee mandates, with oversight being one such mandate.
During the third legislature; i.e., from 2005-2009, oversight was well understood and this could be accredited to continuity of members of the portfolio committee who served in the previous terms of legislature. Study tours were also undertaken during this period. Rosenthal (cited in Benjamin and Malbin, 1992:206) appreciated the fact that the longer members serve in the legislature, the more they learn. Yet, he also argued that what they learn is political knowledge and not substantive knowledge about policy. 
Committee members serve as representatives of the people and are based at the legislature. The legislature at the same time has a mission of being an agent of transformation that strives to defend, deepen, and maintain democracy; make quality laws and policies for the citizen of the province; articulate the needs and desires of citizens; and hold the executive arm of government accountable amongst others. It is therefore necessary to explore the reasons for continuously embarking on study tours as a mechanism to enrich oversight amidst the continuous departmental poor performance and mismanagement.      
1.3 	PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Limpopo Provincial Government has been widely covered in the mass media on its lack of service delivery and corruption (Matlala, 2009; Makhado, 2007; Maponya, 2008; Mosoma, daily). For example, there have been complaints from its citizens regarding poor access or lack of basic services like water, electricity, schools, and health services. These concerns were observed more often when committees were conducting public hearings on section 76 legislations whereby matters of concern in such legislations were overtaken by issues of community interest. For example, during August 2007, public hearings were held on Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Bill across the Limpopo Province. During these public hearings, people complained about the need to have basic services within their communities instead of bringing pieces of legislation that do not assist them.
Departments in Limpopo Province continue to get qualified reports, experience incidences of mismanagement and poor performance. It is not even clear whether departmental officials commit themselves to service delivery (Auditor- General’s reports, Reports of SCOPA hearings, Portfolio Committee reports 2002-2008). In the legislature, members of the standing and portfolio committees continue to embark on study tours as a means to enhance oversight. 
Legislators who constitute committees at the legislature know about the constitutional expectation regarding oversight, but there seems to lack of the understanding the authority (granted by the Constitution) of their role on the oversight functions. AFReC (2005:66) argued that the Constitution does not clearly make any mention of mechanisms or institutional arrangements for effective oversight or even provision for penalties regarding poor, ineffective oversight; or even the lack thereof.  Much of the literature focused on what oversight is; i.e., different types of oversight and how different models of parliament utilize it. However, linking oversight to study tours as tools or mechanisms to enrich it has been minimally explored if at all. This constitutes a knowledge gap, which this study will address.
The study will focus on the third term of the Limpopo Legislature; the intention is to unravel the effect that the study tours undertaken thus far have had on oversight as a function within this institution. Murray and Nijzink (2006:88) argued that “though legislators seems to understand procedures in the law-making, procedures for holding the government accountable are less well established and the interviews conducted for the legislative landscape study suggested that politicians have a much poorer understanding of oversight than the law-making responsibility. There is also little agreement among members as to what oversight means in practice and how it should be carried out”. 
1.4	FIELD OF STUDY

Loftus (1994:ix) stated that “Legislatures are complex and subtle, constantly shaped and reshaped by people, politics, and circumstances. They do not stand still; they are not easy to grasp. The next best thing to serving the Legislature is to observe legislative life…” It is therefore the purpose of the researcher in this study to outline how the Limpopo Legislature was collectively shaped for the public good; and the policy context and processes that necessitated that shape. This study can therefore be understood within the following policy context:
	Institutional policy analysis: Booysen (2009) regards it to be the study of government reform. The legislature therefore utilizes its committees through oversight to enhance monitoring of such a reform. Study tours become some of the tools used to compare and solicit lessons from national and international bodies.
	Policy implementation: Committees of the Legislature have powers to influence departmental policy decisions. Therefore, the effectiveness of oversight can be said to be having a direct impact on implementation of departmental programmes. The effectiveness of oversight would therefore rely on the capacity sourced from study tours by committee members. The same can also be said with recommendations by the House to the department which determine how things can be improved, a concept which might be informed by lessons from other countries.  
	Policy transfer: According to Gumede (2009), policy transfer refers to a process in which knowledge about institutions, policies or delivery systems at one sector/level of governance is used in the development of institutions, policy or delivery system at another level of governance.  Legislatures embark on study tours with a sole purpose of transferring lessons learnt to departments or other statutory bodies. The transfer thereof might assist to effect changes on policies, or the way services are rendered to communities. Therefore, the power of legislature to recommend or impose recommendations or resolutions to the executive can be said to be a policy transfer.
1.5. 	MOTIVATION

There is a need for this research to make people understand the underlying principle behind effective oversight and its contribution to the society. The logic is that committees of the legislature comprise elected politicians. These politicians are responsible for performing the oversight function over governmental departments. For the purposes of playing oversight, these politicians need to know what is expected of them in this exercise. There are both procedural and substantive components. In principle, study tours are important in that they could serve as a mechanism to enrich committee members’ capacity to enable them to perform the oversight function. 
Committees of the Legislature have the power granted by the Constitution; i.e., Section 114 (2)(b) to exercise an oversight role. This role becomes visible when departments take comments and recommendations from committee reports seriously by implementing such recommendations. In essence, this means committee members as public representatives do have interests of the people at heart. Whatever innovations made by the committees at legislature to enhance the system; i.e., to come up with measures to ensure that departments comply with service delivery standards is done in the best interest of provincial citizens. Equally, to enrich the capacity of committee members to contribute to policy development and legislation and to promote better and wider awareness of policy and legislation are done in the best interest of the citizens of the province. The onus is then upon departments to ensure that such interests (people’s) are realized through service delivery. Committees would then check the adequacy of such delivery of services through the oversight function.
It is then relevant for this study to investigate if study tours indeed are mechanisms (or tools) to enrich the capacity to perform the oversight function and in turn impact on the performance of the relevant departments. These two interrelated steps emphasise, respectively, the procedural and the substantive dimensions of the oversight function. 
Oversight is thus used in terms of a function performed by the legislature over the executive; i.e., a function performed by committees over departments. Departmental performance will indicate whether oversight has been substantively effective or not. The main objective is to measure changes in government departments’ performances during the period 2004-2009 by analyzing Auditor General’s reports on their performances. The idea is to check as to whether the committees indeed contributed or had an effect on oversight and whether such an impact has been visible to the committee members. This will be established through interviews with committee members to check their perception about changes in government department. Service delivery is the end product or the outcome of departmental performance, its standard (either poor or good) will somehow be linked to oversight, which is a wheel to drive such a performance. 
1.6     PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study hence aims to establish the importance of study tours, their contribution to policy processes (i.e., policy formulation or implementation), and particularly their link to oversight and their relevance to the legislature. The study further aims to make proposals on how best lessons from study tours can be utilized by policy institutions and sub-systems (legislature and their committees) during their execution of their mandate (oversight function). Study tours should be informed by the need to either learn new things or make improvements on existing practices (of oversight). The purpose of the study is to establish whether this was the case with the Limpopo Legislature and make recommendations to that effect.
1.7  RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The study aims to answer the following questions:-
1.7.1	Primary question: Do study tours contribute to the effectiveness of the oversight function that is performed in the Limpopo Legislature, as perceived by committee members and evidenced in the 2004-2009 term?
1.7.2	Secondary questions
	What is the purpose of oversight and how is it understood by members of the Limpopo Legislature?
	What is the purpose of study tours and how is this purpose construed by members of the Limpopo Legislature?
	How do members of the Limpopo Legislature see the influence of study tours on oversight functions?
1.8	CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION
The following concepts should be understood within the context of this study:
1.8.1 Oversight
This is a mechanism used by legislative committees to hold the executive departments accountable. Senay and Besdziek (1999:2) understood it to be referring to "... the way in which the legislature monitors the administration and effectiveness of the programs that have been enacted into law.” This is in essence, an after-stage – i.e. what the SADC MPs orientation handbook (2003:41) regard as “looking back on government spending and activities to determine whether there was a waste or corruption and to ask value for money questions”.
According to the Parliamentary Model on Oversight and Accountability (2008:6), oversight refers to the “constitutionally mandated function of legislative organ of state to scrutinize and oversee executive actions and any organ of state. This means strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by legislature in respect of implementation of laws and application of budget. It entails overseeing the effective management of government departments by members of parliament/legislature in pursuit of service delivery for a better life for all citizens”. AFReC (2005:63) provided an adapted working definition which states that “oversight is the proactive interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and administrative organs of the province that encourages compliance with the constitutional obligation on the executive and administration to account to the public’s elected representatives, and which advances the ideals of good government, development and co-operative governance”. Oversight is not the only mechanism used to gauge departmental performance, but for the purpose of this research, oversight is seen as the actions of the legislature members to gauge the effectiveness in departmental performance. Study tours that are embarked upon as a means to enhance oversight will be considered so as to establish their impact on oversight.
1.8.2 Study tours
Study tour is an institutional exercise whereby committee members of the Legislature visit national and international places to learn about matters relating to oversight, public participation and law-making – which are the core mandates of the legislature and thus core functions of committees. According to Rapoo (2004), study tours can be seen as important instruments for enabling legislatures to build adequate institutional capacity and skills for effective oversight function. Engaging in regular and first-hand observations of the effects of government policies and how policy implementation affects potential beneficiaries is vital to assist this capacity. 
The SADC MPs orientation handbook (2003) indicates that study tours involve foreign travel to examine how other nations deal with particular issues under committees’ jurisdiction. As such, experiences are shared among committee members.
1.8.3 Accountability
The Parliamentary Model on Oversight and Accountability (2008) defines accountability as an institutionalized practice of giving account of how assigned duties are carried out.  As an institutional arrangement, accountability effect democratic control and improve performance, which will foster institutional learning and service delivery. Accountability of the executive to the legislature is, according to Murray and Nijzink (2002: 87), enforced when the legislature exercises oversight over it and scrutinizes executive action. While Hill (2005) also understands it to be an institutionalized practice, he still maintains that any democratic governance institution is ultimately accountable to the public.
1.8.4 Departmental performance
Departmental performance refers to any activities carried out by the branch of executive sphere of government; i.e., the provincial department as part of policy implementation (Sec 1 of The Public Finance Management Act of 1999 and Sec 7 of the Public Service Act of 1994). Service delivery to communities is, therefore, dependent on this notion. Departmental performance for the purpose of this study will be used as a means to gauge the effectiveness of oversight function performance by committees.
1.8.5 Separation of powers
The doctrine of separation of powers maintains that legislatures make laws, the executives execute them and the judiciaries apply them to cases through the rule of law (Wilson, 1986 and Campell, 2004). The executive branch of government is accountable to the legislature. Rosenthal (1998) maintains that the executive is held responsible for their actions, inaction or omissions. The doctrine of separation of powers is reinforced by the constitutional provision of co-operative governance (sec 41(1) of the Constitution). The relevance of this doctrine is important in this study so that a clear distinction can be drawn between the role played by legislatures over the executive and responsibilities attached to these arms of government.
1.8.6 Committee
A committee is a body of more persons, elected or appointed by direction of the House to consider, investigate or take action on certain matters or subjects or to do all of these things. It may also imply a relatively small number of persons appointed to give a task more detailed attention than it is possible in a large body of the whole House. There are three types of committees; namely, Standing Committees, Portfolio Committees, and Ad hoc or Special Committees (A dictionary of General Parliamentary Language and Procedures for South Africans, 2004).
Standing Committees are constituted to perform a continuing function and remain in existence permanently or for the life of the assembly that established them. Examples include the Standing Committee on Public Accounts and Standing Committee on Petitions and Public Participation. A dictionary of General Parliamentary Language and Procedures for South Africans (2004:64 ) indicates that Portfolio Committees “consider or deal with bills or other matters which are referred to it by the Speaker or by the House resolution; monitor, investigate, enquire into and make recommendations relating to any aspect of legislative programme, budget rationalization and, policy formulation amongst others of the departments falling within the category of affairs assigned to that committee”. Examples include the Portfolio Committee on Education and Portfolio Committee on Health and Social Development. Ad hoc Committees, also called Special Committees are appointed when there is a need to perform a specific task. They are dissolved or cease to exist upon completion of such a task. Crucially, committees are constituted to strengthen legislature capacity to conduct effective oversight of the executive- (Salih, 2005:229).
1.8	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

It should be noted that that there is limited literature on the specific topic of this study. Most of writings on legislature and their operations focused more on public participation and lawmaking as compared to oversight and mechanisms to enhance it. In addition, the literature does not address the theme of the linkages between study tours and the oversight function.
International perspective: There are many ways of understanding how public policy is influenced and according to James and Lodge (2003), the concepts of lesson drawing and policy transfer have been influential in understanding public policy. Inspired by the works of Rose (1991, 1993) on lesson drawing; and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996,2000) on policy transfer, James and Lodge conducted their study in the United Kingdom with an intention to unravel the effects of lesson drawing and policy transfer on policy-making and how they compare to other processes. They thoroughly discussed processes involved in lesson drawing of which in my opinion, some of them constitute study tours. For example, they indicated that in lesson drawing function, the aim is “to draw lessons from policy initiatives and practices in different jurisdictions by looking at the potential for innovation by cross national learning…”(James and Lodge, 2003:179). Policy transfer just like lesson drawing refer to a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in one place or political system is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another place or political system (James and Lodge, 2003).
James and Lodge’ study has shown a particular concern on the expanding literature on Europeanisation in which EU processes impact on domestic policy processes, the rebalancing of domestic coalitions in the face of additional or reduced resources because of EU processes amongst others.
Hulme (2004) used the concepts of lesson drawing and policy transfer interchangeably in his study of assessing the impact of American ideas on British Social Policy. He reflected on a concept of policy learning, i.e. a new knowledge about policy which he highlighted on how it can be utilized by Ministers, policy advisors and civil servants and how the use of such knowledge can define political interests.
Hulme also highlighted on evidence-based practice (which best suit my concept of study tours) which is more about existing evidence from global partners in search for a sound evidence to deal with the uncertain and weak practices by those seeking such an evidence.
Lesson drawing and policy transfer are according to Page (2000) about the transportation of policies and/or practices already in operation in one jurisdiction to another. He differentiated between what he called ‘exporter and importer jurisdictions’, i.e. the former being about practices in the country from which lessons are to be drawn while the latter is about the identification of policies or practices as worthy of emulation by other countries.

Page, Wolman and Connolly  (2004) just like Bennett (1991) have been  critical in their review of what lesson drawing and/or policy transfer entail, more especially because such practices or experiences involve costs (study tours). Page et al (2004), for example, regarded the processes used to draw lessons from other countries as “rational shopping done through institutional isomorphism which is mimetic in nature”; i.e., done by institutions or organizations faced with uncertainty and looking to others for models of reform. On the other hand, Bennett (1991) points out that “foreign evidence can be a post-hoc or validating gesture to facilitate a set of proposals that owe little to cross-national policy transfer, making it difficult to determine what, if anything, is being transferred”. I think what the two were trying to highlight was that while study tours are basically meant for lesson drawing with the intent to bring about change, they should thus be fruitfully utilized.

Informed by the above, it is clear that the international literature brings in some new concepts aligned to study tours; i.e., lesson drawing, policy learning and policy transfer. However, this literature does not align such concepts to the practice and performance of oversight within the context of the legislature.

The study draws on the work from authors who have written on parliament and parliamentary systems, and  more especially on committees and their oversight role. The eminent authors include Nakamura (1999; 2008), Murray and Nijzink (2002) and  Senay and  Besdziek (1999).
The theory of separation of powers would be explored to show the link between the legislature and the executive. The doctrine of separation of powers maintains that legislatures make laws, the executives execute them, and the judiciaries apply them to cases through the rule of law. The task of the legislature is to hold executive departments accountable rather than making or implementing policies. It however can influence the making or implementation of policies. Legislatures approve budget for the executive to implement policies or programs. It is for this reason that I agree with Howlett and Ramesh (2003) when they state that legislatures should be able to demand progressive changes to policies – that is, they have the power to raise and discuss problems of implementation and request changes.
The executive branch of government is accountable to the legislature. The executive is held responsible for their actions, inaction or omissions through oversight.  According to Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson (2004:9), separation of powers becomes feasible on two conditions; namely, “there need to be a certain degree of co-operation between the branches in policy making whereby the legislature must have some capacity to monitor the executive and the executive needs to be willing to comply with legislative enactments”. They maintained that democratic institutions must not only be responsive, but they should also be decisive. In fact, they maintained that policy makers must be able to respond to public demands and urgent policy needs, including commitments to policy. According to Pelizzo et al, though democratization might not improve institutional capacity, it can allow a range of interests to be taken into consideration in making policy and preventing special interest from capturing state power for private benefit, hence a need for checks and balances – a notion maintained by the principle of separation of powers.
One would assume that whether politically literate or not, the principle maintained by the doctrine of separation of powers is famous among most politicians (legislators in particular). However, Salih (2005:250) concluded that “African Parliaments have been more effective in responding to social problems and public interest issues rather than managing legislature-executive relations, assuming their full oversight responsibilities….” He also maintained that despite legislative efforts to deliver on their constitutional mandate of oversight, the executive strives by all means to control the legislature, which in my opinion is the upside down understanding and manipulation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Both the executive and the legislature know where the line should be drawn, but, deliberate confusion often takes precedence. Riley and Brophy-Baermann (2006:235) stated that “ in fairness, it can be hard to tell where to draw the line between legitimate necessity and political fear, but such a line exist and the legislature cross it routinely, even though they complain mightily about how the bureaucrats to whom they pass the buck act when the buck ends up in their hands.”
The doctrine of separation of powers is reinforced by the constitutional provision of co-operative governance; i.e., section 41(1) of the Constitution. The relevance of this doctrine is important in this study so that a clear distinction could be made as to the role played by legislatures over the executive and responsibilities attached to these arms of government. 
Performance of oversight function prior the period 2004-2009 would be closely looked into so as to check whether there was a change in the performance during the period under review. 
1.9 	METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative research, and it is exploratory- descriptive in nature. The approach is informed by the fact that oversight is a well defined subject; however, the literature does not address the linkages of study tours and oversight function. The study would therefore describe the exceptional character which the existing literature is unable to portray. The unit of analysis was committee secretariat and members of the provincial legislature (MPLs) at the Limpopo Legislature.
In order to answer the research questions, the study employs a set of inter-related methods. These include a form of personal biography (based on the researcher’s professional connection to the topic and ‘subjects’ of the study), qualitative in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. The details are:
Personal biography: It is important to note that the researcher is a committee coordinator in the Limpopo Legislature. Part of her duties is to provide procedural and administrative support to committee members. These duties are also rendered during study tours.
During 2004-2009, the researcher accompanied committees on study tours. Observations were made and documented in the form of committee reports.  The researcher agrees with most of the authors who indicate that the disadvantage of participant observation is the difficulty in documenting data; i.e., writing down everything while in the act of participating and observing. However, what the researcher brings to this study is the experience – made out of realities of what the researcher has actually seen and heard in the course of and in the aftermath of study tours. These observations  assisted in the improvement of the design of interviews and focus groups by ensuring the contextual relevance of concepts that are used and the appropriateness of interviews and focus group questions. In essence, this means that having prior knowledge assists in asking appropriate first-round and follow-up questions. The researcher  ensured that she did not allow her work and findings reported to be influenced by her values and work relationships, as Brynard and Hanekom (1997) caution researchers to always guard against bias or give distorted information to maintain research objectivity.
Given the nature of the research problem and associated research questions, the following research methods were utilised:
Documentary analysis: Much of the data to inform the analysis were derived from primary sources such as Hansards, minutes and committee reports. Data were also derived from secondary sources, which included presentation documents, journals and institutions which have undertaken research and wrote about committees at legislatures; e.g., Human Science Research Council (HSRC) and Centre for Policy Studies (CPS). According to Weber (1990), what makes documentary analysis and reference to secondary data rich and meaningful is that the researcher sifts through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. Committee reports on study tours by legislature committees were scrutinized to fathom the lessons learnt from study tours and whether such lessons were implemented or not.
Interviews: Qualitative data were collected through interviews; i.e., semi-structured face to face interviews with Members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs) and the committee secretariat. The choice of the semi-structured interview is informed by the fact that both the researcher and interviewees were equally concerned about the research problem and the interviewees could play active role in shaping and guiding the discussion (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:14). 
Nonrandom sampling (i.e., purposive sampling) was utilized to select the interviewees. According to Neuman (2006:222), purposive or judgemental sampling is meant for special situations, and it is commonly used in exploratory research. This is because it uses judgment or selects cases with a specific purpose in mind, unique cases that are informative, and identifies a particular type of cases for in-depth investigation. The purpose is to gain a deeper understanding of issues within a given context. De Wet et al. (1981:161 –163, in Brynard and Hanekom, 1997:32) indicate that “it also allows the researcher to probe deeper following the answer of a respondent”. 
Eleven people were interviewed; i.e., seven committee secretaries and four members of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature. On the latter, one was a current and continuously serving member of the ruling party (the ANC), one was a former member of the ruling party and two were former members from the two opposition parties (the DA and UDM). The choice of the four MPLs was informed by the fact that they would have undertaken study tours during the term under review, and their different political affiliations would contribute to balanced research through the contribution of a range of party politically differentiated perspectives.
Focus group discussion: A focus group discussion (comprising seven participants) was conducted at a later phase in the research project. The purpose was twofold – both to get group-based perspectives on the contribution of study tours to oversight in the Limpopo Legislature, and to gain reactions to the tentative research findings. The focus group discussion  therefore offered both a form of triangulation (also see Lacey & Luff, 2001) and moved beyond the first set of research findings.
1.10	DATA ANALYSIS 

The researcher used narrative data analysis and interpretation. Griffin (1993) defined narrative analysis as analysis of accounts (of events) which contain an element of transformation or change over time. He noticed that most researchers using this type of data analysis usually use a qualitative approach and he advised that such researchers should use semi-structured interviews, rather than questionnaires. Given that most documents and journals are written in a narrative form and are rich at the level of detail and convey a high degree of authenticity as stated by Abrahamson (2002), it was imperative to utilize narrative data analysis. The idea was not to get a general understanding but to get clarification and understanding on relationship among established themes and concepts. This approach  also assisted the researcher to attach meaning and significance to the research findings in the phase of data interpretation (also see Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003:1-8). 
The researcher also used diagrams as a way of mapping data. According to Neuman (2006:483), diagrams assist in organizing ideas and systematically investigating relations in the data.
1.11	RELIABIILITY AND VALIDITY
 
Reliability and validity are usually complementary concepts which are differently applied by researchers (Neuman, 2006:194-197). Reliability according to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:40-41) refers to “the accuracy and consistency of measures whereas validity refers to the potential of a design or an instrument to achieve or to measure what it is supposed to achieve or measure”. Lacey and Luff (2001:22) indicate that reliability demonstrate to the reader that the methods used are reproducible and consistent while validity will be judged by the extent to which an account seems to fairly and accurately represent the data collected. 
Informed by what the aforementioned authors have said about these two concepts, it becomes clear that reliability is more about methods used while validity is more about interpretation of findings. The study paid particular attention to the respective sets of criteria, and specifically demonstrated the validity and reliability of qualitative data. 
1.12	LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The study is limited to the Limpopo Legislature in the period 2004-2009. It was confined to study tours and their contribution to oversight. It has, for example, not explored the pertinent factor of the cost of study tours. 
The researcher is employed by the Limpopo Legislature and requested permission to undertake the study. An approval was granted. 

1.13	STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study comprised of the following sequence of chapters:
Chapter one: Introduction
This chapter introduces the problem, background, purpose and motivation of study and its objectives, theoretical and literature survey, specify the field of study, state the main hypothesis, note the limitations, explicate the methodology and clarify the concepts.
Chapter two: Literature review and theoretical framework
This chapter provides a brief description of separation of powers, legislature’s oversight role, description of the study tours, their importance and link to oversight; the oversight function of committees and its effect on the executive, policy context of the study – reflection on political decision making within the context of legislature. It will also reflect on available and comparable research on the field of this study.
Chapter three: Methodology
This chapter reflects on how data was collected and analysed, thus contextualizing the research design.
Chapter four: Findings
This chapter discusses the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the collected data.
Chapter five: Conclusion







				LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1	INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a brief description of separation of powers, legislature’s oversight role, description of study tours, their importance and link to oversight; the oversight function of committees and its effect on the executive, policy context of the study – reflection on political decision making within the context of legislature. It also reflects on available and comparable research on the field of study.
The establishment of government is to enhance the contract between those who govern and the     governed. This contract should serve as a means for the protection of individual and public interest (http://anarchistnews.org). For that to be possible, the doctrine of separation of powers was designed with a sole purpose of systematically limiting encroachment by governmental branches (legislature, executive and judiciary) into each others’ functional scope. It is for this reason that the legislature was mandated to exercise oversight over the executive. It is therefore critical that in an endeavor to exercise oversight, capacity should be developed. 
Study tours can therefore be seen as instruments for enabling legislatures to build adequate institutional capacity and skills for effective oversight, an effect which would bolster the separation of powers and in particular also the capacity of legislatures to match the often higher capacities (along with often superior powers) of the executive. This institutional capacity development, as shall be explored, can be seen as a strategy which Nakamura (2008) considered it to produce bodies capable of representing people, legislating and exercising oversight.
While the link between study tours and oversight will be explored, the study also draws on international practices on the theme of the relationship between study tours and oversight so as to determine whether there are similarities or differences to that effect.
The discussion below explores the role of study tours and asks the question if study tours are indeed instruments for capacity building. Oversight as a function or a mandate undertaken by committees will be dealt with in detail.   
2.2	THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

The doctrine of the separation of power was extensively suggested by Thomas Jefferson in the 1785-1825 period (Coates, 1999). Many scholars followed in his footsteps. Woods (2003:1) maintains that the literature that proclaimed the decline of the legislature around the 1980s-90s attributed such a decline to ineffective scrutiny of the executive. He attributed reasons for such a decline to the following failures by legislatures:
(a) counterbalance the power of executives which often had the political influence to suppress and manipulate the legislature so as to discourage it from critical scrutiny; 
(b) keep up with expanding executive bureaucracies in terms of information and the necessary resources like insufficient support staff; 
(c) have its members gain the subject knowledge and technical expertise necessary to discuss, investigate and seriously question the execute actions and performance; and 
(d) exercise effective budgetary powers, i.e. through being denied the latitude to increase expenditure or reduce income. 
These failures amounted to a situation that undermined the doctrine of separation of power; i.e., by undermining arrangements that have been set to assist the doctrine of separation of powers, more especially in parliamentary democracies. Woods (2003:1) also highlighted on how legislatures in reformist countries have failed in demanding the accountability arrangements and oversight opportunities.
On the other hand, Aguda (2008:2) argued that the legislature goes beyond the exercise of legitimate control over the executive because “it follows a pattern of general interference in the routine functioning of the executive and extends to all areas of government activities. It even includes similar intervention in the private sector and calls such interventions as oversight functions of the legislature”. In his argument, he noted that most legislators claim the power to conduct oversight functions; i.e., “legislators want to be seen to be doing their best for the people, not only by making laws that provide instant benefit, but also by being seen as the ones who ensure that those laws are beneficially implemented” (Aguda, 2008:2).
One may therefore question whether the doctrine of separation of powers is alive and well, or not, because, so far, the literature and the practice in parliamentary system does not seem to have an alternative to the doctrine of separation of powers. This is because there is common agreement on flawed practice. Instead, what happens is a practice that acknowledges this doctrine, in principle, yet turns it ‘upside down’.
The doctrine of separation of powers maintains that legislatures make laws, the executives execute them and the judiciaries apply them to cases through the rule of law. The task of the legislature is to hold executive departments accountable rather than making or implementing policies; simply meaning that the executive branch of government is accountable to the legislature. It, however, can influence the making or implementation of policies. Legislatures approve budgets for the executive to implement policies or programs. It is for this reason that I agree with Howlett and Ramesh (2003) when they state that legislatures should be able to demand progressive changes to policies – that is, they need to have the power to raise and discuss problems of implementation and request changes. If this is not done, it means that legislatures are undermining their own authority - if not compromising it. There are contributing factors to this notion: A legislative setting where the majority belongs to a ruling party of which members thereof are expected to support government and insufficient institutional capacity which amounts to minimal role playing by the legislators over the executive. This is despite the fact that in South Africa the doctrine of separation of powers is reinforced by the constitutional provision of co-operative governance (Section 41(1) of the Constitution, 1995). Rapoo (2004:4) conducted comparative research on legislatures in South Africa and found out that the legislatures are generally passive in their approach to the function of executive oversight.
According to Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson (2004:9), separation of powers becomes feasible on two conditions; namely, “there need to be a certain degree of co-operation between the branches in policy making whereby the legislature must have some capacity to monitor the executive and the executive needs to be willing to comply with legislative enactments”. They maintained that democratic institutions must not only be responsive, but should be decisive as well. In fact, they maintained that policy makers must be able to respond to public demands and urgent policy needs, including commitments to policy. According to Pelizzo et al. (2004), though democratization might not improve institutional capacity, it can allow a range of interests to be taken into consideration in making policy and preventing special interest from capturing state power for private benefit, hence a need for checks and balances – a notion maintained by the principle of separation of powers.
As Cooper (1994:366) has indicated, this principle does little to “inform decisions concerning where certain powers should rest, the degree of separateness desired or the protections necessary to ensure the maintenance of separate departments”.  This means that  it has the desire to separate, and within the context of South Africa it also  needs to integrate.
2.3	THE OVERSIGHT ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, in s114 outlines specific powers of the legislature in its exercise of oversight over the executive. Parliament (2008:6) describes oversight as a “constitutionally mandated function of legislative organs of state to scrutinize and oversee executive action. This basically refers to strategic and structured scrutiny exercised by the legislature in respect of implementation of laws and application of budget. In addition and most importantly, it entails overseeing the effective management of government departments by individual members of Cabinet in pursuit of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all citizens.”
Woods (2003) regards oversight to be a legislature’s obligation to monitor the implementation of and to ensure full compliance with governmental systems. Taking up this obligation would then require the legislature’s committees to scrutinize executive government’s performance. Woods also highlighted how oversight should be carried out by committees in the course of their operational duties. Maseko (1998) viewed oversight as the way in which the legislature monitors the administration and the effectiveness of the programmes that have been enacted into law. Equally, Nakamura (2009) observed that oversight occurs toward the end of the policy process; i.e., during implementation of laws. He maintains that the legislature examines the executive behavior, with oversight being a tool for checking the behavior of a single political actor within the executive (probably the Member of the Executive Committee, the MEC). Lees (1977:193) puts it slightly differently and emphasizes bureaucratic impact by defining legislative oversight as “the behavior by legislators and their staff, individually or collectively, which result in an impact, intended or not, on bureaucratic behavior”. 
Nakamura (2009) argued that oversight is not typically bolstered by the same order of external institutional or with the same urgency and visibility as lawmaking. In fact, he simply considered oversight as an important but underused means of giving public representative feedback about how they are leading in a form that is typically hard to ignore. While Murray and Nijzink (2002) maintain that oversight should be seen to be addressing the mechanics of policy implementation, which would include checking whether services were provided to the needy or intended beneficiaries, Salih (2005:2) argued that most of the legislatures are caught between fulfilling governance roles while acting as part of machinery of government.
According to Johnson and Nakamura (1999), oversight occurs after a law is passed and involves monitoring executive activities for efficiency, probity, and fidelity. While most legislatures have some formal oversight powers, effective oversight is difficult to exercise because it requires information about executive branch activities, the legislative capacity to process that information, legislative will to act, and the power to back up demands for improvement. The authors maintain that oversight, even more than lawmaking, puts the legislature into an adversarial relationship with at least some portion of the executive branch. In their arguments, they found that the following are among the most useful oversight powers and capacities found in effective legislatures: a capacity to remove executives, the power to get information from the executive (compel testimony, require reports, etc.), the effective use of the power of the purse, and a functioning committee system capable of knowledgeably monitoring and assessing executive branch behavior. If all of the aforementioned elements could be operationalised, then the executive branch would heed legislative concerns. Few of these elements are tangible in the South African legislatures, and Limpopo in particular, and this helps posit the research problem to the study.
What the aforementioned authors commonly agree upon is that legislatures have a mandate to oversee departments. In order to execute such a mandate, committees; i.e., portfolio, ad hoc and standing committees, are institutional arrangements made by legislatures to the effect that such a mandate is realised. Further, committees need a considerable amount of capacity to exercise their powers over the departments. 
In order to exercise oversight, committees (a) obtain first-hand information from people involved in the direct implementation of specific programme; (b) invite experts from outside government to provide background knowledge and analysis on relevant issues; and (c) may go on study tours or visits that entail physical inspection, conversing with people, assessing impact of delivery and make reports whereby they include recommendations to the House for adoption (Parliament, 2008:18). According to Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau (2006:39), the effectiveness of oversight would then depend on the quality of reports generated through the aforementioned processes, the level of preparation of committee members and the pursuance of issues raised.
One may argue that oversight should not only be conducted with regard to the execution and implementation of policies by the executive, but that it should also be done with regard to preparations of policies. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004:4) observe that such oversight should use tools which are called “instruments of control ex ante”. The idea is not for the legislature to police the executive, but to advise them in an endeavor for the betterment of lives of communities. Informed by what Pelizzo and Stapenhurst maintained in as far as ex ante and ex post oversight is concerned, it becomes even easier to locate lessons from study tours to be tools that allow for engagements during both ex ante and ex post oversight by the legislature.
2.4   UNDERSTANDING HOW OVERSIGHT WORKS

Oversight is an evaluation to assess program effectiveness or efficiency. It poses a platform to raise concerns or complaints arising from the public. It involves investigation to detect waste and corruption. It is therefore critical to the legislature and to effective democratic governance.  In reviewing the literature, more emphasis will be placed on international practices. Later on in the discussions, the study will be positioning Limpopo legislature experiences and trends against the expositions in the literature.
There are two types of oversight at the level of the legislature. These are field-based oversight and in-house oversight. Field-based oversight is an oversight conducted outside the premises of the legislature. According to Parliament (2007:37-39), committees as delegated instruments to perform such a function may undertake oversight visits to investigate particular issues. These visits are important oversight mechanisms that allow committees to directly assess the implementation of policy in specific settings. The effectiveness of these visits would then depend on the quality of reports generated thereof, the level of preparation of committee members and the extent to which issues which are raised are further pursued.
In-house oversight is an oversight that is conducted within the premises of the legislature or in any other place that the legislature considers it to be within its precinct in terms of its Standing Orders and Rules. It is a legitimate expectation that oversight should be done from the planning stage of the departments. In other words, a legislature is expected to practice oversight not only when strategic plans of departments are presented before it, but even during planning phases of departments; i.e., the period at which departments decide on what should constitute their plans. Woods (2003) maintains that it is necessary for committees to consider (a) departmental strategic plans to examine the policy objectives and goals of each department; (b) service delivery plans to appraise the particular services, recipients of those services and their intended delivery dates; (c) the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) to look at government’s long term plan and its continuity on policy implementation; and (d) annual budget to actually assess the budget for informed position before voting on the budget. Parliament (2007:76) warned on “a need to strike a balance between short-term, delivery-focused oversight and policy oversight - which generally has a long term focus by focusing on interrogation of appropriateness of policies and ensuring that existing policies do not determine the framework within which oversight is conducted”.
It is also a legitimate expectation that oversight should be done during the operational stage; i.e., by considering monthly reports of the departments when there is a need (perhaps because of problematic government operation) so that such a situation could be closely monitored. Consideration of quarterly reports is meant to establish whether key performance indicators are met or not, to check the reasons thereof by interrogating officials concerned and make recommendations where necessary. Annual reports are also considered so as to compare the actual results against the budgetary spending.
Budget or fiscal oversight is an example of in-house oversight carried by the Public Accounts Committee called the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), in this instance in the Limpopo Legislature (a body that is similar to the national-level SCOPA, which operates in parliament). Its mandate is 
	to enhance financial management standards in public sector institutions…; has a duty to assist the legislature in ensuring that public sector institutions remain within their budgets and spend according to the purposes determined by legislature, are held accountable if they do not comply with the law and regulations concerning their financial management, provide value for money in services provided to the public and the state and develop and implement the necessary financial management capability and good governance practices (Association of Public Accounts Committee - APAC, 2003:3-4). 
APAC also maintains that legislatures need audited financial reports from provincial government departments and public entities that are accountable to it; these reports would include reports and recommendations from SCOPA to inform their response to financial statements so as to exercise oversight over the management and use of public funds.
In the international-comparative context, Ohio State in the United States of America (USA), for example (http://www.legislature.state.oh.us), has a legislative oversight that is done in a slightly modified form. In that instance a body called the Legislative Service Commission is formed to assist other state agencies in their compilation of reports to the legislature. This commission serves as a legislative budget and program oversight commission with its own staff. The staff is divided into sections; e.g., fiscal staff to provide an independent source of fiscal information relating to state revenues and expenditure, a sunset review committee to formally evaluate state boards and agencies on regular basis, and other staff for review of all administrative rules adopted by the executive branch agencies. There are the so-called “special oversight committees” which include non-legislators. These committees deal with specific and narrowly defined issues and are assisted by the staff of the Legislative Service Commission (LSC). In one of the Legislative Service Commission reports, it was indicated that during oversight processes, particularly those concerning budgets, to some extent legislators determine relative funding levels for programs on the basis of information they receive by questioning executive branch administrators during budget hearings (http://www.legislature.state.oh.us). In the Limpopo Legislature, legislators do not determine funding levels for programs but are rather told by the executive who shall have determined such levels through the assistance of the Provincial Treasury department. Their task as legislators is to check whether funding for programs would not compromise service delivery and compare such funding levels with previous years. This  brings in the question of capacity to carry out certain functions.
The oversight role of the Limpopo legislature has its own challenges, which include the expertise at the legislature which is lower and cannot be matched with that of departments. When the researcher interacted with counterparts from different legislatures  from other provinces in South Africa during committee forums, it was realized that most legislatures experience difficulties in performing their functions of overseeing the executive due to limited expertise. However, Hänggi (2001) advised that other measures could be explored to assist with the oversight function. These include the use of expertise of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international parliamentary assemblies such as Commonwealth Parliamentary Associations (CPA), think tanks, study tours and universities.  The Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC, 2008) saw legislative oversight to be very weak in many countries and regarded that to be a contributory factor to corruption. They therefore recommended that parliamentarians or legislators should, in an endeavor to play an important oversight role, participate where appropriate in regional and international initiatives. In addition, legislators could engage in new and creative means to enhance the practice in oversight role by undertaking study tours where legislators could engage with their global counterparts. 
Because an oversight role requires constitutional authority, along with the human and financial resources to investigate government programs, the UNDP (2002:6-8) argued that special efforts should be made to involve the executive branch in assistance programs so that oversight would be a co-operative process and not a policing function. The ultimate objectives relate more to the effectiveness of the legislature than to its efficiency.
Effective legislative oversight relies on what Stapenhurst et al. (2005:10,19) regard as supporting factors. As found in their study, the power to choose subjects for exam without government direction or advice pointed to - : 
	 co-operation of all parties on the committee; clear focus on accountability rather than on policy; 
	effective research staff with knowledge of public administration and accountability; committee members with relevant experience; and
	effective chairing; clear vision of improvements needed on public administration; power to report conclusions, suggest improvements and make follow-ups and power to select issues without government direction. 
They maintain that oversight requires knowledge, skills and experience that many legislators do not have – persons who often report difficulty in learning on the job. The authors, however, strongly stress that the possession of the aforementioned powers does not necessarily guarantee success and neither does their absence necessarily hinder effectiveness. 
Ineffective oversight may occur as a result of  a number of factors; namely, poor quality reports, non-adoption of committee reports by committees themselves or the House, insufficient training provided to legislators on the responsibilities of oversight mandate, insufficient opposition parties, new legislators who might come up with a certain culture of practice, insufficient or incapacitated support staff, lack of political will in carrying out this mandate and power relationship, amongst others. 
Sherpard (in Pelizzo et al., 2004) also highlighted how the context and behaviour (as in determination) of legislators can determine the effectiveness of the legislature in its oversight over the executive. In addition, Norton (1985:21; 2002:79) stressed the importance of attitudinal and behavioral changes occurring alongside any institutional reforms. Norton also stressed the importance of using time appropriately; i.e. he was concerned about how time can be wasted on strengthening committee members if they are unable to cooperate and unwilling to exploit opportunities afforded to them by such change. On the other hand, Judge (1993:215) argued that “the normative system of the House reflects the preferences of those with the most power and so attitudinal change and internal procedural reform will invariably fail unless key constitutional arrangements are addressed”.
Informed by the aforementioned, it is important to note that committee members’ attitudes may contribute to weak legislative oversight. This would therefore mean that, at times, the legislature might find itself having powerless committees. As it might not be easier to notice this weakness (powerlessness), committees may deem it necessary to continuously engage on study tours in search of skills enhancement – for the exercise of oversight. Executive officials may also take advantage of the powerlessness of committees and not deliver on their mandate. 
In essence, the legislature must know and understand the operations of the executive so that the budgets allocated to such operations and policies regulating such operations do tally. This would make the legislative oversight role much easier, thus limiting a search for oversight tools. If oversight tools are the institutional devices that are associated with the transition of countries to full democracies, then it becomes of considerable importance for ordinary people to better understand the dynamics of parliamentary/legislative oversight and the role that oversight tools can play in the promotion of government accountability. Consequently, they will know democratic development, good governance and be able to identify examples of good practice practices (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004:21-22).
2.5	FACTORS WEAKENING OVERSIGHT

The main aims of oversight are to improve the efficiency and economy of governmental operations; evaluate programmes and performance; detect and prevent poor administration and unconstitutional conduct; protect civil liberties and constitutional rights; ensure that the executive policies reflect the public interest; gather information to develop new legislative proposals or amend existing statutes; and prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and prerogatives (Kaizer, 2006).
For the exercise of this function, Kaizer maintains that procedures should be in place. He offers the example of the United States of America where the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 has been used to direct the House and Senate standing committees to exercise continuous watchfulness over programmes and agencies under their jurisdiction. The legislation also authorized such committees to review and study on a continuous basis the application, administration and execution of laws and increased professional staff of committees. While Limpopo Legislature has comparable legislation, in the form of the Limpopo Legislature Service Act of 1997, the Limpopo Act does not provide specifications or leading details on how committees can exercise their oversight. It only outlines powers and duties of political office bearers and the Secretary of the Legislature. However, there are the Limpopo Legislature Standing Rules of the House which explain and authorize the manner in which oversight should be carried out, though such authority or procedure is minimal.
Born (2006:75), in his assessment of parliamentary oversight of defence in Asian countries, distinguished avenues for strengthening parliaments which are: (a) legal powers; (b) capabilities and (c) willingness. On the latter, he indicated that if parliamentarians are not aware of executive decisions or not willing to hold the government to account, these legal powers and capabilities are of no avail. Despite the party politics or power structures of political parties, which sometimes prohibits members to execute their oversight function in a critical manner, Malbin and Benjamin (1992:216) argued that sometimes even legislators let their political interests and goals dictate whether to resist the executive, whatever their technical capacities. This, unfortunately, leads to a weakened institutional capacity in as far as an oversight purpose is concerned. Aguda (2008:2) added that “legislators are by their nature politically restless … they thrive on publicity whereas their role as sober, reflective lawmakers doesn’t give them much of this … They have the power to effectively determine the direction of government policies …”
Scheiner in Pelizzo et al. (2004:31) stated that “the need for oversight is greater in the case of a system that relies almost exclusively on executive initiatives…” They also maintained that it is the weakness of the bureaucracy that makes oversight necessary and problematic. Giving a situation of Parliament and public policy in Indonesia, he extensively showed how the power of the legislature relies on the well established power of the state., This means that  limiting the formal agenda setting and legislative policy making roles of the legislature has left Indonesia to vest so much power in its ministries. In light of this, Scheiner argued that Indonesia  needed an effective oversight, which was unfortunately not put into practice . Furthermore; using police patrol methods of oversight for example, where legislators regularly monitored government agencies when they had been paid off seemed worthless and thus made oversight problematic. Stapenhurst et al. (2005:19) argued that despite the importance of oversight, it is a shame to note that within most Commonwealth parliaments the committee has never recommended to the House that it censure the government for contravening the law, nor has it ever recommended to the House that it exercise its penal power of arrest and detention over government officials who fail to comply with orders of the House. The Limpopo Legislature, however, offers contrasting evidence. In particular, it has set an example of such penal powers when dealing with corruption, such as in the case of the Managing Director of Gateway International Airport (Landman and Associates, 2007:21-22). Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004), on the other hand, highlighted that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels and levels of democracy. They showed how countries with parliamentary forms of government, high per capita income levels and which are more democratic do not only have a great number of oversight tools, but have a greater oversight potential.
The Centre for Democracy and Governance (CDG; 2000:8) stated that “conducting oversight of the executive may be less politically rewarding than sponsoring legislation or serving constituents, and may even be politically dangerous. However, vigorous oversight promotes accountability of the executive more effectively than any other mechanism, and thus, is basic to a strong legislature”.
2.6	STUDY TOURS AS EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES

Study tours, as the name suggests, refer to a process of engaging in a trip to an area out of the usual space to learn or study about topical issues which are considered to be of importance to governance practice. According to Page, Wolman and Connolly (2004:2), study tours more especially, and if undertaken by legislators or government policy makers, are equivalent to policy study visits. These are therefore “formal visits/tours made by participants to a specific site/s outside of their own jurisdiction to observe and gather information about policy or policies at the site/s” (Page et al., 2004:2). Their understanding is that study tours or policy study visits are a means of policy learning. They define policy learning as a form of institutional learning which is meant to bring about change. 
Page (2004) also defined study tours to be learning visits or policy learning engagements. He understands learning in two phases; i.e., learning from direct experience and learning from the experience of others. He further states that policy learning, because of its nature (that of changing the policy sub-systems) requires that the knowledge acquisition be spread to relevant decision makers and any decision should be based on facts and knowledge and a culture of responsibility, which, according to Dudina (2008:2), requires literacy and knowledge. Dudina acknowledges study tours as a professional way to acquire new horizons. This requires a certain composition of the visiting team. At an institution like the Limpopo Legislature, that team would comprise committee researchers and committee coordinators. More often, this team gathers more information for committees’ work and advise these committees accordingly.
Study tours can be seen as important instruments for enabling legislatures to build adequate institutional capacity and skills for the effective implementation of the oversight function. Engaging in regular and first-hand observations of the effects of government policies and how policy implementation affects potential beneficiaries is vital to facilitate this capacity (Rapoo, 2004), even if this type of ‘tour’ is mostly regarded as constituency work or policy monitoring. According to Nakamura (2008), institutional capacity development strategy, based on assisting legislatures’ committees, can be seen as a plausible strategy intended to produce bodies capable of representing people, legislating and exercising oversight.
Polsby (in Nakamura, 2008) noted that developing and stable democracies depend on effective representative legislative institutions and these are, in turn, characterized by a degree of control over their own internal environments and structures like committees. He further highlighted that for legislatures to serve effectively as instruments for accountability, they require not only resources but greater institutional capacities. Such capacities would include, amongst others, the need to have political and administrative staff who are experts in the field of advice and operational duties. 
Parliamentary study tours can also be useful exercises in fostering relationships and breaking down barriers among political groups and between parliamentarians and staff. The sharing of experiences from other parliamentary contexts can build confidence and create a commitment to parliamentary reforms. Parliamentary study tours are most effective when theory is combined with practical experience and when they are well planned and organized to allow for dialogue and hands-on experience with host organizations (UNDP, 2002:16). While the National Conference of State Legislatures (2009) acknowledges the fact that exchanging information with foreign parliamentarians and staff can offer various perspectives on public policy development, it however made an agitation on how time-consuming, complicated and expensive study tours and logistics thereof can be. This is particularly true for international tours, which may also require arrangements for language interpretation.
2.7   THE IMPORTANCE OF STUDY TOURS WITHIN A LEGISLATIVE SETTING

A strong case can therefore be made for committee members in their roles as critical decision makers in the legislature, to be given an opportunity to observe and learn how other committees elsewhere in the world carry out their functions. They could also benefit from learning the impact of such functions, including how that impact has assisted in reforming or shaping the legislature. According to the CDG (2000:27-30), study tours can be seen as part of “building a support base” more especially during the design of legislative activities. It maintains that “once legislators have together observed effective legislative services or members working together to strengthen their institution, especially in a legislature in a state of development similar to their own, they may be more willing to support activities to strengthen their legislature”. 

The CDG offers a wide range of advice on how legislatures in developmental states can empower themselves as a way of strengthening their institutions. Parts of this CDG advice is suited to the concept of study tours. The rest of this section interprets the CDG (2000) advice and relates pertinent parts of the advice to study tours within the legislative context. The advice includes:

(a)	 Study tours should seek to accomplish specific objectives: If the goal is to develop a base of support in the legislature for its reform, participants should have the political strength to influence the legislature; i.e., the study tour location and program should be selected with specific goals in mind.

(b)	In the case of international study tours, the country of visit should be chosen carefully: Many countries may for different reasons appear to be appropriate sites to visit, but what becomes important is to check the system of governance, i.e. to check whether the host country is a presidential, parliamentary or hybrid system and to check even the constitutional structure of the country and the associated the powers of legislators and the electoral system, to cite just a few checking points. This would determine whether the visiting legislature is relevant or not to the host. It does not assist much, for example, to learn about federalism and its practices if the visiting party is from a unitary state – unless  the specific goal (as alluded to before) is to change the system of governance (Cameron and Falletti, 2005:248). 

(c)	Timing: Timing of the study tour is an important aspect which the visiting country should thoroughly consider. Legislators should not be taken out of the country when they are needed for government reasons at home. What this means is that one cannot expect committee ‘A’ to embark on a study tour during consideration of the budget for example. It will compromise the House quorum and quorum in other committees which will ultimately affect well informed and collaborative political decision making.

(d)	 Co-ordination: Study tours should be coordinated to avoid having too many legislators from the visiting country travelling at the same time. In simpler terms, this means that a committee in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature, for example, may decide to visit Brazil to learn about how modern farming techniques assist farmers and how traditional farming can be sustained or how the two complement each other.  KwaZulu-Natal Legislature would then liaise with the Department of International Relations regarding the envisaged tour. The Limpopo Legislature committee would decide on the same tour and would liaise with Department of International Relations. This department should therefore inform the two legislatures about their similar tours and let them seek ways to jointly undertake the tour. Alternatively, committee coordinators in different legislatures can liaise with one another so that duplication of duties is avoided. 

Another important aspect is for the Department of International Relations and Cooperation to seek a report of the findings regarding the tour so that, should there be a similar tour in future, such a report can assist. If this type of coordination can be effected, it will save costs and avoid embarrassment on the visiting legislatures  -- as they might be seen to be lacking direction or political agenda and it will also reflect badly on the type of administrators supporting committees at legislatures.

(e)	 Involving appropriate participants: If a project under study requires that experts, professionals and other relevant individuals be available at the time of visit, that should be well arranged (as alluded to above). 

When investing in study tours, it is imperative for legislators to check whether those that will be representing them in a foreign country know what is expected of them, are likely to remain employed with the legislature and the level of influence they have either inside or outside the legislature. In essence this refers to the intellectual capacity among legislators in terms of fact finding, fact presentation and the ability to mobilize relevant support that might assist decision making.

(f)	Reporting: This is a critical activity in the aftermath of the study. A detailed report should be written, considered and adopted by both the Committee and the House. Such a report should then be sent to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, to the relevant provincial department and/or stakeholders for either implementation of recommendations or consideration of advice offered thereof. This would to a large extent assist in terms of policy formulation or policy implementation.

Brugge (2006: 13) maintains that a committee of the legislature wanting to make policy directly may be an objective that is more difficult to attain within the current political system, i.e. the Westminster system as adopted by South Africa.   As alluded to earlier on, legislatures are not very significant actors in the policy making and implementation process, but their role is limited to that of advising the executive and monitoring and evaluating the implementation of programmes. Because this role demands knowledge and expertise, study tours become relevant not only as policy learning instruments, but also as lesson drawing practices with an intent to transfer the knowledge acquired. 

2.8   STUDY TOURS AS LESSON-DRAWING PRACTICES AND POLICY TRANSFER

According to Rose (2001), lessons are meant to be tools that guide actions. He regards study tours to be the lesson-drawing practices. According to Rose (2001:2):

	…lesson-drawing is future-oriented, drawing on current experience in other countries to improve national policy. It offers an evidence-based alternative to developing a new programme. It is evidence-based because a lesson is based on programmes that have been operating for a long time elsewhere. Attention is focused on the measures that other countries employ to deal with a problem similar to one's own. It is based on experience, albeit the experience of other countries rather than one's own government. In this sense it is similar to the academic study of comparative public policy, which systematically examines how different countries deal with a similar problem in such fields as health, unemployment, etc. 

James and Lodge (2003:180) defined a lesson as “a detailed cause-and-effect description of a set of actions that government can consider in the light of experience elsewhere, including prospective evaluation of whether what is done elsewhere could someday become effective here”.  Lesson-drawing, according to them, holds the view that policy decisions are based on searching for means to pursue goals in a systematic and comprehensive manner; i.e., reviewing policy with an idea to make adjustments where necessary. They found the lesson drawing concept to be a rational policy making which stresses the organizational-cultural processes involved in learning. These processes include the following: copying - enacting a more or less intact program already in effect, adaptation - adjusting for contextual differences, making a hybrid - combining elements of programs from two different places, synthesis - combining familiar elements from programs in a number of different places to create new programs, and inspiration - using programs elsewhere as an intellectual stimulus to develop a novel program (James and Lodge, 2003).

Dolowitz and Marsch (1996:344) regard policy transfer and lesson-drawing both to refer to “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place”. Lesson-drawing and policy transfer are according to Page (2000) about the transportation of policies and/or practices already in operation in one jurisdiction to another. He differentiated between what he called ‘exporter and importer jurisdictions’; i.e., the former being about practices in the country from which lessons are to be drawn while the latter is about the identification of policies or practices as worthy of emulation by other countries. Stone (2000:7) extended it further by indicating that policy transfer has many similarities with lesson-drawing;i.e., policy transfer is about “understanding the process by which policies and practices move from exporter jurisdictions” while in lesson-drawing the emphasis is about “understanding the conditions under which policies or practices operate in exporter jurisdiction…” 

Lesson-drawing and policy transfer, she argued, can be an outcome of learning. Transfers of ideas or programmes are underpinned by deeper and prior processes of learning, thus making policy transfer a social and collective process founded on exchanges between groups. Stone (2000:37) concluded that: 

	the capacities and intentions of actors in the lesson-drawing process differ considerably and will shape the interpretations of policy experience, which lessons are drawn and how and why they are exported, imported or imposed. Furthermore, ideas discourse and arguments are slippery and can be enacted in many different ways. The design, techniques and extent of policy implemented will be unavoidably shaped by local conditions of existing constellation of interests entrenched in institutional structures and political culture to the effect that hybridization, synthesis and modification is inevitable. 

In essence she meant that policy transfer relies on decision makers and power holders (powers that be) for such ideas to be selected for transfer and for them to be institutionalized.

Hulme (2004) considered policy transfer as an analytical tool connecting explanation of change in global social policy and also advised policy makers to intelligently make use of knowledge transferred from other contexts. He expatiated on the levels under which policy transfer operates, namely, the global level which involves international and transnational structures, domestic which involves governments or policy trajectories. Considering policy transfer as part of policy learning which he regarded as a slippery concept, he also expatiated on how it can be used by different theories; e.g., he maintained that policy-oriented learning can take place between ministers, civil servants, policy advisors or intelligentsia.

Page (2000) and Bennet (1991) have been highly critical in their review of what lesson drawing and/or policy transfer entail, more especially because such practices or experiences involve costs (just like study tours). Page (2000:5-6), for example, regarded the processes used to draw lessons from other countries as “rational shopping done through institutional isomorphism which is mimetic in nature”; i.e., done by institutions or organizations faced with uncertainty and looking to others for models of reform. On the other hand, Bennet (1991:32) points out that “foreign evidence can be a post hoc or validating gesture to facilitate a set of proposals that owe little to cross-national policy transfer, making it difficult to determine what if anything, is being transferred”. It appears that the two were trying to highlight that while study tours are believed to be lesson-drawing with intent to bring about change, they must therefore be utilized for nothing other than such an objective. 

Each and every policy process has its own challenges which might result in intentional or non-intentional errors. James and Lodge (2003:188) distinguished between three types of policy transfer errors. Uninformed transfer means that the borrowing country may have insufficient information about the policy or institution and how it operates in the country from where it is being/was transferred. Incomplete transfer means that crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional structure a success in the originating country may not have been transferred. Inappropriate transfer refers to insufficient attention regarding social, economic, political and ideological differences between the transferring and borrowing countries.

2.9   INTERPRETATION OF THE LITERATURE IN RELATION TO THE LIMPOPO LEGISLATURE

The objective of this section is to use the literature to set benchmarks that will constitute an important part of the analytical framework for the analysis of my research data.
According to Paskalev (2002:9-10), “Legislatures’ capacity to influence policy outcomes is greatest when it is highly institutionalized … [and when it has] highly developed committee structure.” Paskalev also identified several characteristics of the legislative committees that are deemed critical for the overall strength of the committee system and the legislature itself. On the basis of a comprehensive comparative study of several European countries, Norton (in Paskalev, 2002:10) maintained that there is an “apparent correlation between certain institutional features and the ranking of the legislatures within the family of the reactive legislatures.”  Nakamura and Johnson (2003) made a distinction between emerging and reactive legislatures. Emerging legislatures are legislatures attempting to and to some degree succeeding at becoming more powerful and independent. Barkan (2005: 14) maintained that “committee systems in emerging legislatures are not fully established, but they have developed some observable capacity to contribute to the legislative process”. Reactive legislatures respond to what government brings forward and the government will usually get what it wants (Norton, 1998:4). Noting that the Limpopo Legislature as one of the nine provincial legislatures in South Africa cannot be ranked within the family of reactive legislatures, but that of emerging legislatures, it is also apparent that it emulates certain features of both families (i.e. reactive and emerging) of the legislatures. 

It is a global trend for committees to be called ‘an extension of the House’. CDG (2000:41) indicated that “legislatures, like other complex institutions, accomplish more when they divide their work among smaller, more specialised units”.  AFReC (2005:80) amplified that “the main function of committees in the national and provincial legislatures is to develop expertise, gather information and to do the detailed work, which will enable informed decisions to be made about public policy”.  Limpopo Legislature is no exception to this notion.

The Limpopo Legislature has both standing and portfolio committees. These committees comprised groups of people appointed by the House, from amongst its members, to perform functions which the House has entrusted to them and to report back on those matters. The trend that emerged from the literature regarding committees, their composition and roles is not different from the Limpopo Legislature. However, another trend shows that in some legislatures, depending on the type of parliamentary system, the specialised unit would be established so as to report to the legislature on behalf of the committees. The Ohio State Legislature is an example of these legislatures that support committees. 

The professional advice and the other resources available to the committees are also crucial in enabling the members to question effectively and influence the governmental policy (Paskalev, 2002:10). The Limpopo Legislature has committee coordinators and committee researchers who advise committees on their core mandate. It also has party committee secretaries and party researchers who advise individual members in their respective political parties.

The oversight roles by the legislatures follow essentially similar trends in presidential and parliamentary systems. That is, the executive accounts to the legislature. The crucial variable is the extent to which oversight is exercised. As CDG (2000:8) argued, legislatures vary in their ability and willingness to undertake these activities [oversight for example] depending on constitutional structure, access to budget information, powers to review and amend budgets, power to confirm and remove the executive appointments and the relationship of parties in the legislature to parties in the executive.

Study tours within the context of this study are tools that are used by committee members in the Limpopo Legislature to enhance their capacity to conduct oversight. According to the CDG (2000:47), the ability of legislatures to keep track of action of the executive is enhanced tremendously if they have the formal authority to do so. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996, sec 114) gives the Limpopo Legislature and the other provincial legislatures the formal authority to track actions of the executive through oversight. While the authority to exercise oversight is within the purview of the Constitution, there are still some challenges in as far as legislature oversight powers are concerned. In other words, the inabilities of committee members to realize and acknowledge the powers vested in them (lack of self-awareness in short) by the legal document, by the political party and the electorates are a challenge. As the CDG has suggested, perhaps study tours and conferences that expose legislators to other systems may encourage change in what has become a practice; i.e., an ineffective way of conducting oversight.





Study tours should expose members to different systems and bring them together (ruling and opposition parties and their staff) despite their different views and opinions with a view to collectively understand oversight as a function in the legislature and to achieve certain objectives. 

There are alternatives that might add up to oversight capabilities. CDG (2000:48-49) outlined such as including amongst others;
-	requesting meetings with the executive to discuss important issues over the next year; 
-	finding ways to improve access to government departments which is often easier when Members of the Executive Council are also members of the legislature; 
-	developing sufficient expertise in order to understand what the executive is doing with the budget; 
-	requesting online access to governments accounts; 
-	using public committee meetings and hearings to focus attention on issues requiring government response; 
-	learning to apply interest group pressure on the executive and selecting a few issues which will interest media and public to get the executive to focus on them.











research DESIGN AND Methodology
3.1	Introduction

This chapter presents the research methodology which will review the purpose of the study and will discuss the data collection, data procedures and limitations of the research. The methodology outlined in this chapter follows directly from the purpose and the research questions that inform the study. The main methods that have been used to gather the required research data were interviews and focus group discussions, supplemented by documentary analysis. The researcher’s professional position also enabled her to assume a role of direct observer of many of the phenomena that were studied and are reported on in this thesis. 
The rest of this chapter presents the details of and motivation for the choice of each of the methods – in the context of the purpose of the study.
3.2	Purpose of the study

The purpose of this study is to establish the importance of study tours, their contribution to policy processes (i.e. policy formulation or implementation), and particularly their link to oversight and their relevance to the legislature of the province of Limpopo. The study further aims to make proposals on how best lessons from study tours can be utilized by policy institutions and sub-systems (legislatures and their committees) during their execution of their mandate (oversight function) (Chapter 1). Study tours should be informed by the need to either learn new things or make improvements on existing practices (of oversight). The purpose of the study is to establish whether this was the case with the Limpopo Legislature and make recommendations to that effect.
In order to ensure that the purpose of this study becomes feasible, it was necessary to review literature on two variables/concepts, namely oversight and study tours (Chapter 2). This necessitated an exploration on how study tours link with oversight as a function within a legislative setting and the way in which such a link might be useful if fruitfully utilized. At the same time, it was also important to describe oversight and how it has been practiced in various legislatures (including those in South Africa) so as to determine whether such a practice has been different with what the Limpopo Legislature had been doing during the term under review.
This study is a qualitative research project. Strauss and Corbin (1990:17) defined qualitative research as “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of qualification”. Phenomenological inquiry or qualitative research, as referred to by Hoepfl (1997:1) uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to understand phenomena in context-specific settings. 
The study is exploratory-descriptive in nature. Eisner (1991:36) cited in Hoepfl (1997:3) indicated that “qualitative research reports are descriptive, incorporating expressive language and the presence of voice in the text”. Hoepfl (1997) elaborated further by indicating that qualitative research has an emergent design and an interpretive character, aimed at discovering the meaning events have for the individuals who experience them and the interpretations of those meanings by the researcher. The exploratory-descriptive approach of this study was informed by the fact that oversight is a well defined subject; however, the literature does not address the linkages of study tours and the oversight function. Lincoln and Guba (1985:120) advised that “if you want people to understand better than they otherwise might, provide them information in the form in which they usually experience it.” The study therefore explores the exceptional character which the existing literature is unable to portray. The unit of analysis is the committee secretariat and members of the provincial legislature (MPLs) in the Limpopo Legislature.
In order to answer the research questions, the study thus employs a set of inter-related methods. These include a form of personal biography (based on the researcher’s professional connection to the topic and ‘subjects’ of the study); documentary analysis; qualitative in-depth interviews; and focus group discussions. The details of the application of each of these methods are mentioned hereunder:
3.3	RESEARCH PROCEDURES AND DATA COLLECTION

Jackson (1994) highlighted how the value of research is related to its data collection methods and how important it is to include both primary and secondary data in one’s research.  Babbie and Mouton (2001) supported Jackson’s view by indicating that data can be primary in that it is found closest to the problem being researched. Further that it can be secondary in which case it is indirectly connected to the problem being studied. 
In this study, data was collected with a purpose of obtaining information from documentation and participants so that the researcher can establish a factual basis for making recommendations. The three main methods used were participant observation, documentary analysis and a focus group.
3.3.1	Personal biography 
It is important to note that the researcher is a committee coordinator in the Limpopo Legislature. Part of her duties is to provide procedural and administrative support to committee members. These duties are also rendered during study tours. Participant observation is thus one of the methods of data collection employed in the research project.
In the period 2004-2009 the researcher accompanied committees on study tours. Observations were made and documented in the form of committee reports.  The researcher agrees with authors who indicated that the disadvantage of participant observation is the difficulty in documenting data; i.e., writing down everything that is relevant while in the act of participating and observing (May, 2001 and Bowling , 2002). However, what the researcher brings to this study is the experience – made out of realities of what the researcher has actually seen and heard in the course of and in the aftermath of study tours. 
These observations have assisted in the design of interviews and focus groups by ensuring the contextual relevance of concepts that are used and the appropriateness of interview and focus group questions and themes. In essence, this means that having prior knowledge assisted in asking appropriate first-round and follow-up questions. 
The researcher has ensured that she doesn’t allow her work and findings reported to be influenced by her values and work relationships, as Brynard and Hanekom (1997) cautioned researchers to always guard against bias or giving distorted information, instead of maintaining research objectivity or balance. The researcher guarded against what Reich (2003) and Guillemin and Gillam (2004) called ‘reflexivity’; i.e., the influence the researcher could cause in the research process.
3.3.2	Interviews 
Although the researcher understands that self-completed questionnaires can be “just one of a range of ways of getting information from people or answers to research questions”, as argued by Gillham (2000:2); guided by the nature of this study and the sample size, the researcher found it appropriate to largely stick to interviews. It was determined that both the interviewer and interviewee would get an opportunity to seek further clarification about questions with respect to this study.
While the importance of questionnaires is not underestimated, this study mainly used face to face interview methods. A major rationale was to use a method that would leave room for clarifications and follow-up. Drolet and Morris (2000) showed that face to face interviews led participants to feel at ease with each other. Holbrook et al (2003:83) maintained that face to face interviewers are able to observe nonverbal cues exhibited by respondents and can also observe events that might distract the respondent. The use of face to face interviews was therefore useful to get expressions of experiences and to determine any perceptions that might be raised by participants during the interview session.  In other words, information conveyed in gestures was to a certain extent helpful in determining whether participants share similar views or not. 
Semi-structured face to face interviews was utilized so that interviewees could talk freely and openly while in-depth information was shared during the process. Hoggart et al (2002:214) maintained that “semi structured interviews reflect individual views, values and opinions…”.The choice of the semi-structured interview was informed by the fact that both the researcher and some interviewees are equally concerned about the research problem and the interviewees played an active role in shaping and guiding the discussion, the type of situation that is referred to by Rubin and Rubin (2005:14). 
Despite the time-frame under which this study was conducted, i.e., the budgeting cycle and interrogation of provincial departmental annual reports by committee members and the need to recap on activities shelved during the hosting of 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup, telephone interviews could have been utilized but were not. The disadvantage would have been that the researcher could not have been able to see the respondents and read the non-verbal communication. Carr and Worth (2001) and Garbett and McCormack (2001) cited in Novick (2007:393) reported the disadvantages of telephone interviews as including amongst others; lack of telephone coverage for some participants, absence of visual cues, the potential of distraction of participants by activities in their environments and reduction of an in-depth discussion as compared to face to face interviews.
While Rubin and Rubin (1995:141) supported the views by Carl and Worth; and Garbett and McCormack (2001) respectively, Novick (2007:391) challenged their views regarding telephone interviews. He indicated that 
telephone interviews are largely neglected in the qualitative research literature and, when discussed, they are often depicted as a less attractive alternative to face-to-face interviewing…..telephones may allow respondents to feel relaxed and able to disclose sensitive information, and evidence is lacking that they produce lower quality data. 
Novick concluded that face-to-face interviews seem to be enjoying the gold status as compared to telephone interviews. Guided by the lack of merits of telephone interviews, the researcher found it necessary to avoid what Novick referred to as three principal types of data loss or distortion resulting from the absence of visual cues; namely, a) loss of non-verbal data – responses such as facial expressions and body language; b) loss of contextual data – information about the environment and features of the respondents; and c) loss or distortion of verbal data -  spoken words; hence the use of face to face interviews. The idea was to unravel the perceptions by respondents regarding the purpose of both study tours and oversight and how the two complement each other.
After consideration of issues that were to be explored and clarified, an interview guide was developed. The purpose of the interview guide was to direct discussion and to stimulate conversation about the research topic as well as to ensure that all the desired information was sought (Dorito et al. 1994 in McLafferty, 2004:189). The interviews of the former MPLs were conducted at their respective offices and each lasted for thirty minutes on average. The interviews for committee secretaries were conducted at the Legislature in two days and lasted for two and half hours respectively. While I had hoped that all questions could be answered to my expectation, I found it difficult to get satisfying answers from MPLs . In other words, while all questions were answered, they dodged some of the questions by providing ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers even when further probing was enhanced.  Data was recorded in the form of an audio recorder and notes. While Bottorf (1994) and Polgar and Thomas (1995) in McLafferty (2004:191) warned against the use of microphones or audio recordings, supported by Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Patton (1990:348) regarding their ‘indispensability’; the study necessitated the use thereof as it assisted the researcher to review the discussion and tally it with notes taken. Respondents’ permission to record was sought prior the interviews. Due to the political context under which this study is carried out, respondents’ names were not used in the report. 
Initially, the researcher had envisaged to interview eleven people, i.e., seven committee secretaries and four members of the Provincial Legislature (MPLs). Due to resignation of two committee secretaries and declination of one MPL, only five committee secretaries and three members of the Limpopo provincial legislature were interviewed. The latter comprised the former member of the ruling party (African National Congress - ANC) and the former members from the two opposition parties (the Democratic Alliance - DA and United Democratic Movement - UDM). The choice of the former MPLs was informed by the fact that they would have undertaken study tours during the term under review, and their different political affiliations will contribute to balanced research through the contribution of a range of party politically differentiated perspectives.
3.3.3	Focus group discussion 
A focus group discussion (comprising five participants) was conducted at a later phase in the research project. Carey (1994:226) defined focus group technique as “using a semi structured group session, moderated by a group leader, held in an informal setting, with the purpose of collecting information on a designated topic”. Focus groups can be exploratory and aimed at generating hypotheses and can be phenomenological in that they give access to people’s common sense conceptions and everyday explanations (Calder, 1977 in McLafferty, 2004:188). Notwithstanding people’s experiences, meanings, understandings, attitudes, opinions and knowledge as subsets of phenomenology (McLafferty, 2004:188); the purpose for employing focus group discussion within the context of this study was twofold – both to get group-based perspectives on the contribution of study tours to oversight in the Limpopo Legislature, and to obtain reactions to the tentative research findings. The focus group discussion therefore offered both a form of triangulation (Lacey & Luff, 2001) and moved beyond the first set of research findings.
While neither homogeneity of the focus group was not fully maintained as recommended by Carey (1994) nor the heterogeneity as recommended by Calder (1997); the group was able to interact with each other and rich information regarding the study was produced. The group was comprised of five participants as alluded; i.e., mini-group according to Greenbaum in McLafferty (2004:190) and was manageable. Though Carey (1994) viewed the researcher as always not the best person to act as a moderator, I moderated the group discussion successfully. In short, ground rules were set and agreed upon by the group, the purpose of research and necessity for the group interview was properly communicated, assurances on confidentiality was made, my role as a moderator well explained, the group members were allowed to express what they felt and thought and the atmosphere was conducive (McLafferty (2004:191). The session was recorded as aforementioned.
3.3.4	Documentary analysis 
In order to complement interviews, the study made use of analysis of documents. Kelly (1999:191) acknowledged that documentary analysis can be a useful technique for investigating decision making within organizations and can reveal more than the institutional or organizational agenda. What makes documentary analysis and reference to secondary data rich and meaningful is that the researcher sifts through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion (Weber, 1990). The rationale for using documentary analysis in this study was that the exploratory nature of this research heeded a need to assess information on study tours through analysis of internal institutional information. Much of the data to inform the analysis was derived from primary sources – such as committee reports, Hansards and minutes. In fact, information on study tours undertaken at the legislature was clearly outlined in committee reports other than minutes and Hansards. While secondary sources like journals and presentation documents on AWEPA and CPA were analysed (http://www.awepa.org (​http:​/​​/​www.awepa.org​)) and (http://www.cpa.org (​http:​/​​/​www.cpa.org​)), observations on the contribution of study tours to oversight function were based on international experiences and were not explicitly confined to the South African context. 
While the views by Kelly were noted, this study further revealed that documentary analysis can also reveal institutional dedication on institutional agenda as shall be seen in Chapter 4.
The point of departure for analysis was to gather all committee reports on study tours undertaken during the period under review. These reports had terms of references, i.e. purposes of study tours as well as recommendations. Hansards and minutes were also analysed but there was insufficient information regarding the study tours (Chapter 4). The next step was to analyse purposes of study tours and recommendations against consideration and adoption of such reports; tabling in the House; and adoption of such reports into House Resolutions and referral of such resolutions. This process involved immersing oneself in the data, allowing themes and subthemes to emerge, considering the themes in relation to the overall study, the standing of the reports and a constant reflectivity on the interpretation of the text in relation to other forms of data (Kelly, 1999:192).
3.4	SAMPLING 

Warwick and Lininger (1975:69) described a sample as “some part of a larger body specifically selected to represent a whole. Sampling is a process by which this part is chosen”.  According to Family Health International (2009:05), it is not possible to collect data from everyone in a community in order to get valid findings. Only a sample which is a subset of a population is selected for any given study. The primary purpose of sampling is to collect specific cases, events, or actions that can clarify and deepen understanding (Neuman, 2006:219).These arguments also pertain to non-random sampling, albeit with certain conditionalities (such as generalisability to a broader population).) 
Non-random sampling (i.e, purposive sampling) was utilized to select the interviewees. According to Neuman (2006:222), purposive or judgemental sampling is meant for special situations and is commonly used in exploratory research. This is because it uses judgement or selects cases with a specific purpose in mind (Trochim, 2006:1), unique cases that are informative and identify a particular type of cases for in-depth investigation. The purpose is to gain a deeper understanding of issues within a given context. De Wet et al. (1981:161–163, in Brynard and Hanekom, 1997:32) indicate that it “allows the researcher to probe deeper following the answer of a respondent”. De Vaus (1986:68) amplified this by indicating that “purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling where cases are judged as typical of some category of cases of interest to the researcher. They are not selected randomly”. 
Based on the purpose of the study and the aim thereof, the purposive sample that was selected included five committee secretaries (5) and three (3) former members of the Limpopo provincial legislature. Committee secretaries and these MPLs served in the legislature in the period that is explored in the study. The rationale for selecting them was that in purposive sampling, what is sampled is not people, but ideas (Trochim, 2006:3). The selected participants were sampled with a view to provide deeper insight regarding the contribution that study tours had on oversight function in Limpopo Legislature and they provided useful information to the study.
3.5	DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The researcher is aware of Atlas ti, (computer package for data analysis in qualitative data) but did not use it; instead, she made use of narrative data analysis and interpretation. Griffin (1993) defined narrative analysis as analysis of accounts (of events) which contain an element of transformation or change over time. He noticed that most researchers using this type of data analysis usually apply a qualitative approach and he advised that such researchers should use semi-structured interviews, rather than questionnaires. Given that most documents and journals are written in a narrative form and are rich at the level of detail and convey a high degree of authenticity, as stated by Abrahamson (2002), the study necessitated narrative data analysis. The idea was not to get a general understanding but to get clarifications of and insights into the relationship among established themes and concepts. This approach assisted the researcher to attach meaning and significance to the research findings during data interpretation (Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003:1-8). 
Tape-recorded interviews were transcribed and together with written notes, the data was analysed. Themes emerged from the analysis and were therefore grouped so as to establish categories. Categories were established and were comprised of themes which were similar or related in meaning. This relationship prompted further subcategories as shall be seen in Chapter 4. Similarities, differences and variations were detected during analysis.
The researcher used diagrams as a way of mapping data. According to Neuman (2006:483) they assist in organizing ideas and systematically investigating relations in the data.
Given the researcher’s personal biography; and guided by Laverty (2003:7) with respect to illuminating details and seemingly trivial aspects within experience that may be taken for granted in our lives; the study employed an interpretation based on hermeneutic phenomenology with a goal of creating meaning and  achieving a sense of understanding.  Polkinghorne (1989) in Laverty (2003:7) advocated that “in both phenomenology and hermeneutic phenomenology, data can include the researcher’s personal reflections on the topic, information gathered from participants….”.
3.6	QUALITY CONTROL
 
The notion of reliability as one of the quality concept in qualitative research as argued by Stenbacka (2001:551) needs to be solved in order to claim a study as part of proper research. The quality of a research is related to generalizability of the result and thereby to the testing and increasing the validity or trustworthiness of research (Golafshani, 2003:603). Although the ability to generalize finding to wider groups and circumstances is one of the most common tests of validity for quantitative research as argued by Golafshani, generalizability as one of the criteria for quality studies depends on the case selected and studied (Patton in Golafshani, 2003).
Reliability and validity are usually complementary concepts which are differently applied by researchers (Neuman, 2006:194-197). Lacey and Luff (2001:22) indicate that reliability demonstrates to the reader that the methods used are reproducible and consistent while validity will be judged by the extent to which an account seems to fairly and accurately represent the data collected. The researcher employed triangulation to ensure the quality of data in this study. While it is acknowledged that triangulation is mostly used in quantitative paradigm for confirmation and generalization of a research (Golafshani, 2003:603), the study relied on methodological triangulation to combine data from interviews, focus group and documents and matched it against observations to check if ever there were similarities, differences or variations in the findings. Risjord et al. (2001:41) described methodological triangulation as “the use of two or more different kinds of methods in a single line of inquiry”. They indicated that it increases reliability, validity or accuracy of the study.
In what Welman et al. (2005: 189) called stringent criticism, I should inform the reader that because of the intimate knowledge of the milieu (individuals and practices) of the period under study, I am aware of what Gottschalk (1969) referred to as internal and external criticism in stringent criticism and have provided information for which the validity or authenticity can be tested.
3.7	ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
3.7.1	Institutional approval
The researcher has written a letter to the Secretary of the Legislature (CEO) to conduct the study and has been granted permission.
3.7.2	Respect for persons
Family Health International (2009:08) advised that “whenever we conduct research on people, the well being of research participants must be our top priority”. A written form requesting permission for an interview was circulated to and signed by MPLs. An email was circulated to committee secretaries/coordinators and emails and telephonic confirmations were made by participants. Before interviews, participants were verbally informed about the purpose of the study; the voluntary participation and the freedom to withdraw from the study if they so wished; and permission to record the session.
3.7.3	Confidentiality
The researcher has ensured that information is collected in confidence from participants. In other words, during interviews, only the researcher and interviewees were involved, their anonymity was secured and the presentation of results attests to this.
3.8	ACCESSIBILITY

As previously indicated, the researcher is employed by the Limpopo Legislature and access to the institution was not difficult. Committee reports were already available, though some of the Hansards were missing while some of the minutes were not available. Access to internet was also available.
3.9	CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the use of different methods (as in methodological triangulation) can be beneficial in qualitative research. In fact, methodological triangulation has assisted the researcher to answer research questions posed in this study.
















PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
4.1     INTRODUCTION

The literature as reviewed has shown that study tours and oversight are complementary in application. Through the interviews and documentary analysis the chapter highlights and outlines that notion. This is made possible through data that has been gathered, the derived results and analysis made. 
The chapter first presents the results from the collected data. In order to complement the literature review, the study made use of interviews from former members of the Limpopo Provincial Legislature and members of the focus group. The researcher used these research techniques so as to gain understandings from the exact people who had embarked on study tours. Rubin & Rubin (2005) recommended that interviews should be chosen as techniques whenever one needs to learn about something in depth from another person’s point of view, or directly from that person’s experiences. The authors further recommend interviewees (or, for that matter, focus group participants) who are knowledgeable about the research problem.  
Later in the chapter the data analysis links themes developed in the study, which were illuminated in the empirical study, with pertinent aspects of the literature review. The goal is to link the description of oversight and the exploratory nature of the link between study tours and oversight function to the research findings.
4.2    DATA FROM RESPONDENTS

In order to answer the first secondary question, i.e. what the purpose of oversight is and how it was understood by members of the Limpopo Legislature, the study utilised responses from interviews of both members of the focus group and MPLs. The next secondary questions on what the purpose of study tours is and how the purpose was construed by members of the Limpopo Legislature, including how the latter see the influence of study tours on oversight functions, were answered by considering the responses from interviews of MPLs, members of the focus group and secondary data (in the form of committee minutes, reports and HANSARDS).
Respondents from the focus group were labelled as CC1-CC6 whereas MPLs were labelled as MPL, ANC; MPL, DA and MPL, UDM. It should be noted that at the time of data collection, all members of the focus group were in possession of honours degrees in respective fields. One of them was in possession of a Masters degree, while two were still studying towards the completion of their Masters degrees. They could thus be expected to engage in-depth with relevant aspects of the research problem.
4.3    FINDINGS
4.3.1	The purpose of oversight and how it was understood by members in the Limpopo   Legislature
With respect to the first secondary question, the researcher used concise factors that will enable the reader to understand what oversight entails, requirements needed for carrying out the function of oversight and other key factors that contributed to the understanding of oversight by members in the Limpopo Legislature as reflected in the discussion below.
4.3.1.1	The crucial role of the Legislature
The literature and the current practice have shown that the Legislature has three main roles, namely; law-making, public participation and oversight over the executive. Limpopo Legislature, just like other legislatures in South Africa is required by law to exercise oversight over the Limpopo Provincial Government (sec 114 of the Constitution of RSA). The function of oversight is embedded upon the shoulders of committees in the Legislature. As indicated in chapter 1, there are Standing and Portfolio Committees in the Limpopo Legislature whose main task is to conduct oversight function. This is supported by Salih (2005:229) where he indicated that “crucially, committees are constituted to strengthen legislature capacity to conduct effective oversight of the executive”.
While oversight is a constitutional requirement, the study explored perspectives on how members in the legislature understood the details of the requirement. The study revealed that oversight is seen to be a function geared towards government performance and has different facets, i.e. it takes a form of in-house and field based activities.
“It is a word used by politicians to check government conformation to service delivery”. “It entails monitoring of expenditure and performance of the executive by the legislature”. “It involves inspection in loco and document analysis”. CC1, CC3 and CC5, respectively.
As a tool used to gauge government service delivery, oversight requires committee members to thoroughly understand how it needs to be exercised. In other words, there is a need for committees to know and understand what is expected of them during the performance of oversight. While it is necessary to have both members of the ruling party and opposition on the same page during the performance of this function, it was however, established by the study that there was no common understanding of oversight during the period under review. For example,
“92-95 % understood it very well to be referring to monitoring of government’s conformation to service delivery”. CC3.
“There was no common understanding because there were members who believed that they should support the executive while others drew a line between legislature and executive”.CC6.
Because of lack of common understanding of oversight by committee members, it was therefore difficult for them to thoroughly engage the executive on issues under discussion. Common understanding of oversight was not the only issue that was needed to effectively perform the function, but other factors were necessary to broadly highlight how the purpose of oversight should be understood. These aspects are next explored.
4.3.1.2 Education as a requirement
The study has vastly shown that there is a need for a certain level of educational     requirements to execute committee work, in particular, the oversight function. This was established by critical analysis from both responses from MPLs and focus group members. The study focused on the influence of education on the performance of oversight.

a)	 Educational requirement by committee support staff
According to the requirements of the post for the Committee Secretary/Coordinator, a candidate should at least possess an Honours degree in Social Sciences plus five years experience in similar duties. A Committee Researcher should at least be in possession of Masters Degree plus relevant experience in research work. Most committee support staff, i.e. both coordinators and researchers, possesses such qualifications. 
While the study did not go deeply into the qualifications of committee support staff, the researcher’s knowledge of the context of the study assisted the process, as she is the coordinator herself. The relevance of education is to provide knowledge, amongst others. Knowledge of the political context is necessary for execution of committee work. It necessitates the understanding of political behaviour, political issues and sensitivities that go with the political environment. In other words, it helps the person to understand the political dynamics in the legislature. This understanding then enhances committee support staff capacity in their drafting of reports, minutes, strategic plans and procedural advices. Ultimately, the capacity thereof would advance into skills in carrying the afore-mentioned activities.
The study has shown that lack of skills by staff poses a serious problem in committees’ oversight function. For example,
“Committee coordinators did not have skills to advise.” MPL, DA.
“SCOPA, for example, needed chartered accountants but only administrators were employed there. There was no empowerment for clerks and specialised skills were necessary.” MPL, UDM.
These notations question the level of skills required to carry out the administrative support by committee researchers and coordinators. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004:1351) describes a skill as “the ability to do something well”. Common sense denotes that a qualified university student has been awarded a qualification on merit. However, MPLs felt that committee support staff did not have required abilities to support committees. This raises the question as to whether committees should be supported by experts in particular portfolios, or by qualified committee support staff as the posts shall have required. 
It can also be argued that despite the educational qualifications of support staff, the level of presentation of different people would vary distinctly.
“Committees relied on committee coordinators. There were few researchers who were not good with analysis.” MPL, DA.
By implication, committees might have relied on committee coordinators as they were good compared to committee researchers. This may also imply that in some committees, committee coordinators presented themselves better as compared to others; thus creating an impression among committee members that some have skills while others do not have.
This therefore creates an impression that education and skills alone, though necessary, may not be sufficient; but expert knowledge might be more important for committee support staff.
“There were no experts accompanying committees for thorough engagement.” MPL, UDM.
This comment suggests that the institution should revisit its requirement on the post of committee support staff as it reflects that education may not be the only requirement, but expert knowledge is also key to committee support function. There is also a need for these requirements to tally with those of committee members.
b)	Educational requirements by committee members
The political trend throughout the world shows that politicians do not need to be highly educated to represent people/electorates. Nakamura (2008) maintained that a person needs to be an engineer to fix cars as much as one needs to be a lawyer to deal with laws. He also argued that most legislators pass laws yet they do not know anything about such laws. It is a practice in the South African context that most public representatives were not elected to their positions on the basis of educational background. However, when these representatives are at the legislature as MPLs, they are required to perform functions which need a certain level of education.
On the one hand, the study has shown that oversight as a function requires a certain level of understanding of executive affairs and the ability to engage the executive on such affairs. On the other hand, the study has shown that more often than not, few committees had such expected knowledge.
“(S)ystems for effective oversight were fine but the capacity to carry the function in the legislature was a challenge because some members were educated while others were not.” “Limited capacity led to passing of budgets without knowledge”. CC2.
“Most committees understood oversight though there were difficulties in others”. MPL, ANC.
“...MPLs are not academics....”. MPL, DA.
The comments above indicate that even MPLs acknowledged that some of their colleagues were not educationally capable, to the extent of carrying out the oversight function. This therefore calls for a need to have a certain level of education for committee members to have a common understanding and interpretation of oversight.
4.3.1.3	Understanding political agenda
	Political agenda should be seen as the framework which guides the ruling party and eventually, a framework informing the country’s governance systems. While it can be argued that the manifestos of the ruling party constitute one such a framework, it remains questionable that most of the committee members from the ruling party in the Limpopo Legislature seem to be clueless about what it entails.
There is a need for political representatives to be politically orientated about the legislature and its committees. That should be a principle enshrined in by the political agenda. The same should be done about the separation of powers. In other words, MPLs should be able to know what their work entails and how it relates to that of the executive. Members of the Executive authority should also follow suit and provide guidance to executive departments. This will not only assist both arms of government during accountability, but will also help them understand their roles and responsibilities that go with accountability. It will therefore be possible to make an oversight function easier than it is currently:
‘(T)here is [a] different interpretation of oversight by committees. Common interpretation of oversight is not easy to define”. MPL, DA.
“(T)he executive did not answer questions as expected, but rather played games and were not factual. MECs thought they were above the law”. MPL, DA.
This therefore means that having a common understanding and interpretation of oversight will tie members to a well informed oversight, which will ultimately mean that they understand their expectation in this function; i.e., a drive towards the country’s political agenda. It is therefore important to outline what the study has depicted as strengths and weaknesses with regard to the oversight function.
          a)	Factors obstructing successful oversight
	The study has revealed that successful oversight in the Limpopo Legislature during the period 2004-2009 was obstructed by many factors. This has been depicted in the following responses:
“Committees were unable to make reasonable recommendations. The capacity to carry [out] the function of oversight in the legislature was a challenge because some members were educated while others were not”. CC4.
“Members could not dig information beyond what was presented”. CC1.
These comments reflect that the capacity of members to carry out the function is very important as it provides insight on what is expected during oversight.
Separation of powers was shown by this study to be a challenge. In fact, there is a need for both the executive and the legislature to better understand this concept.
“Limitations on separation of powers were a challenge. Executive had two legs; one in the executive and one in the legislature. It was therefore difficult to oversee the executive because seniority and juniority came into play. That is, overseeing the Premier who is political senior in the party and the province. Oversight was therefore blurred”. CC2.
The comments raise questions as to whether separation of powers as a doctrine was a problem or whether the problem lied with a politician within the doctrine. The point is that despite who occupies which position in the party, the principle in the doctrine should be respected and maintained. The political framework guides both seniors and juniors in government and legislature and so is the responsibility to understand how the doctrine functions. The same can be said with understanding how committees themselves operate.
The study has supported the literature review regarding the distinct manner in which committees operate. Committees like SCOPA did not undertake site visits in their performance of oversight, but relied heavily on in-house oversight. Other committees (portfolio) engaged in both in-house oversight and field-based oversight so as to interrogate information and monitor departmental projects respectively. The onus is then upon members to draw a distinction between the two types of oversight and apply them accordingly.
The study revealed that in some instances, some committees did not bother to differentiate the two afore-mentioned types of oversight.
“it differed with committees but generally, [the] legislature’s mechanism of oversight was not effective. [The] Public Works committee relied on calling [the] department to account rather than oversight visits”. CC2.
While this can be said to be lack of understanding of the dynamic nature of oversight, it can also be linked to ignorance. This ignorance could be attributed to both a lack of skills by members and committee support staff, and lack of political will.
“Committees relied on analysis of research. Members were failing to read documents or didn’t have documents to engage departments robustly. [The] research team was ineffective and knowledge of bureaucrats was questionable. These therefore posed a challenge to the effectiveness of oversight.” CC6.
It is therefore evident that members’ inability to seriously input during oversight, political power, lack of understanding, the selective approach adopted by some committees in their exercise of oversight and lack of skills pose a serious challenge to oversight. In other words, they obstruct oversight.
b)   Factors contributing to successful oversight
Committees have legal obligation afforded to them by the Constitution to exercise oversight. There is a need for committees to be purposeful in their constitutional mandate. When they perform this function, it is not because they want to be bossy over departments, but because they are required by the supreme law to do that. Equally, the executive should understand that accounting to the committees of the legislature does not render them insubordinate, but because the political system through the supreme law acquires them to do that. In short, this understanding should set the basis of cooperation between the legislature and the executive.
The study showed that some of the committees understood and showed dedication towards their constitutional obligation.
“SCOPA had clear oversight systems and was therefore effective in its oversight function. It had powers to recommend the removal of accounting officers, e. g. HOD and MEC of Limpopo Department of Transport in 2006”. CC3.
“....but there was continuous failure to submit the required information. This led to some of accounting officers dismissed”. MPL, ANC.
4.3.2	The purpose of study tours and how it was construed by members of the Limpopo Legislature	




Study tours undertaken during 2004-2009 by MPLs in the Limpopo Legislature
Committee	Year of study	Place of visit	Purpose	Lessons drawn: Same to purpose or not?	Report adopted by committee	Report tabled and adopted by House	House Resolutions by the Legislature and their benefits on oversight and impact on service delivery
Education	2005	Cuba	Outcome based education and oversight	Same	Yes	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit /impact)
Agriculture	2005	New Zealand	Small scale farming and oversight	Same	Yes	No	Despite non-tabling and debate by the House, recommendations on the report benefited an agricultural company called  ZZ2 on organic farming. ZZ2 is a larger farm situated in Limpopo around Louis Trichardt and is a larger producer and exporter of tomatoes in the country. 
Agriculture	20082009	EgyptTanzania	Irrigation schemes Rural agricultural development	SameNo	YesNo	NoNo	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)None(i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)
Public Works	2007	Australia	Global impact on infrastructural development and oversight	Same	Yes	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)
Economic Development and Finance	2005	Canada	Oversight, financial accounting techniques, government support of SMMEs and expansion of entities	No	No	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)
SCOPA	20072009	AustraliaMalawi	Budget oversight over departmentsBudget oversight over departments	SameSame	NoNo	NoNo	No House resolutions as the reports were never tabled. However, the practice of oversight improved. This therefore meant that committee recommendations were put to practice.  In short, non tabling of the reports did not prohibit committee members to implement what they have learnt in Australia and Malawi.
Safety and Security	2007	Venezuela	Border control and oversight	No	No	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)
Public Works	2006	KwaZulu- Natal	Comparative study of departmental programmes , EPWP and oversight	Same	Yes	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)
Sport, Arts and Culture	2007	Eastern Cape	Planning, organizing, monitoring and evaluation of Grahamstown Arts Festival and application of lessons  to Mapungubwe Arts Festival	Same	No	No	None (i.e. no House resolution and therefore no benefit/impact)

4.3.2.1	Issues informing study tours
All committees in the Limpopo Legislature that had undertaken study tours did that with the intent to strengthen their capacity on oversight (see Table 1) and to learn about other issues pertaining to their respective portfolios. The literature has shown that there is a need for parliamentarians or legislators to engage in exchange programs through study tours and regional workshops, amongst others (CDG, 2008). The study revealed that study tours undertaken during the period under review were basically meant for learning the best practices in oversight, hence a need to explore how committees in the legislature used study tours as learning tools. 
a)	Study tours as learning tools
	According to Rose (2001), study tours can be regarded as lesson-drawing practices. Page (2004) regarded them as policy learning visits or policy study visits, whereas Dolowitz and Marsch (1996) and Page et al. (2000) regarded them as policy transfer tools. While these authors agree that the main purpose of study tours is to learn and apply the knowledge learnt into practice, the study revealed that this notion is not always the case. In other words, the study has shown that in other instances the intended purpose of study tours did not necessarily produce the desired or intended results. For example, Table 1 showed that of the eleven (11) study tours undertaken in the period of study, eight (8) reflect that lessons similar to intended purpose were drawn whereas three (3) study tours resulted in lessons other than the intended ones. It is important to note that even in some study tours where committee members managed to draw lessons, such lessons were not beneficial to departments or communities. Stated  differently, though in some study tours lessons were drawn, reports regarding such lessons never reached the House so that resolutions thereof would impact positively on either oversight or service delivery by the provincial executive departments.
The study established that the main reason for study tours not producing the intended or desired results was that there was not much concerted effort on research prior the tours.
“The need was not properly analysed. Tours were not well informed and there was no political value”. MPL, DA.
“The idea was not only to strengthen oversight, but to bring in other concepts, e.g. studying something that cannot be implemented like Australia’s vision 2020”. CC2.
The notations imply that while it was necessary to strengthen capacity on oversight through study tours, it was also fun to learn just what other counterparts were doing, not that it made sense or added value to the intended purpose of the tour.  A need analyses is something that was supposed to have been dealt with prior the tour to establish whether the tour was necessary or not. This therefore calls for empowerment prior to study tours.
The study uncovered variations on how committee members and support staff viewed empowerment prior to study tours.
“Members were fully empowered by support staff through workshops and conferences prior tours”. CC6.
“There was no empowerment for coordinators. Specialised skills were necessary”. MPL, UDM.
It is a common practice that committees hold briefings prior to oversight visits and study tours. The purpose is to discuss the main approach and ideas that could be shared during the process. It is during these briefings that both committee members and support staff empower one another. However, CC4 claimed that “committees were at times misled by researchers”.
One of the most important things to consider when embarking on study tours is the type of political system of the host country. It is also necessary for committees to be conversant with their own political system. In other words, when committees visit, hypothetically, a capitalist state or a purely communist state when their country is none of the aforementioned, then there is a problem. Depending on the issue under study, the idea of learning with the intent to implement may be difficult to attain. This will therefore result in what Page (2000) referred to as “rational shopping” simply because there will be absolutely no lesson to bring back home. In fact, CC5 has mentioned that “the Committee on Safety and Security went to Venezuela ... thus making a visit totally a holiday and shopping spree. As such one would say that the study tour turns out to be meaningless”.
It is therefore necessary for committees to understand the importance of utilising study tours as learning tools and how lessons from such tours can benefit the electorates which they represent.
4.3.2.2	Benefits of study tours
The literature has shown that study tours if fruitfully utilised, and depending on the lessons learnt, can bring about global social policy change (Hulme, 2004). Further that they should not be used as tools to waste taxpayers’ money without engaging in substantial activities (Page, 2000).
The capacity and intentions of committee members during study tours are critical as they can assist in shaping or bringing change to policies of the provincial executive departments. This study however, has uncovered that study tours undertaken during the period under review were not necessarily on par with what Stone (2000:37) indicated when she stated that “the capacities and intentions of actors in the lesson-drawing process differ considerably ... and will shape the interpretations of policy experience, which lessons are drawn and how and why they are exported, imported or imposed ...”. Instead, it has shown that despite the lack of formal oversight systems, SCOPA, and the Agriculture and Public Works Committees were able to implement what was learnt during study tours. Moreover, the study has shown that only SCOPA has been consistent with the best practices learnt as compared to other committees. CC3 said “SCOPA went to Malawi and ever since that study tour, [to ensure that officials who are found guilty of corrupt activities during oversight are arrested on the spot] it called police officers to form part of oversight [proceedings].”.
Most study tours, as previously noted, were undertaken with the intent to strengthen the capacity on oversight functions. However, the study revealed that such an intention was minimally achieved. Notwithstanding that the legislature was supposed to be the main beneficiary, neither the Legislature nor provincial departments benefited desirably from study tours, as shall be seen in the discussion to follow.
4.3.3	The influence of study tours on the oversight function and how members in the Limpopo Legislature viewed it
	Oversight systems which emerged from lessons from study tours, the impact of committee resolutions on provincial executive departments as a result of the findings during study tours, and the general perception of the influence of study tours on oversight function form the basis of the discussion in this section.
4.3.3.1	Oversight systems emerging from study tours
	According to Spady (1994:8), the outcomes of learning are knowledge, skills and values. This suggests that learning outcomes should involve demonstration of learning through performance. Equally, knowledge of the lessons learnt should be manifested through this performance.
	A system is described by the free online dictionary (http://www.thefreedictionary.com (​http:​/​​/​www.thefreedictionary.com​)), as referring to “an organised set of interrelated ideas or principles or an organised and [set of] coordinated methods”. The study revealed that out of eleven study tours undertaken, only one committee; i.e., SCOPA, managed to come up with an oversight system – part of what can be referred to as a learning outcome. Even though the system was not formal (i.e. not institutionally documented), it has been operationalised consistently. This means that of all committees that went on study tours, SCOPA has proven to have taken its mission to improve on oversight seriously by manifesting lessons through performance.
	The study also revealed that in some study tours, neither oversight nor issues aligned to the committee concerned formed the basis for study tour. For example,
	“The committee on Finance and Economic Development went to Canada to learn about expansion of entities. The study tour was not informed by the need ... Limpopo had numerous entities then”. CC4. 
The same can be said regarding the Public Works and Agriculture Committees, 
“Tanzania was said to be the best with rural agricultural development, yet it was found to be the worst. It instead leant from Limpopo on how rural agricultural development was carried out”. CC1. 
“Public Works learnt from Australia that the department has to employ its own technicians and engineers”. CC2.
These observations therefore mean, amongst others, that a committee went on a tour to conduct studies into things they already knew, a common sense matter. The other committee was generous enough to spend money on a study tour so as to be a workshopping agent. Tours of this nature did not assist the legislature to come up with oversight systems or improve on the oversight capacity.
Verbal expressions of what was learnt are necessary, but not sufficient, to substitute for systems. In other words, if a lesson could be documented, be formalised and thereafter applied, it would set a clear direction towards a framework which would ultimately contribute towards the system. The Third Legislature of the Limpopo Province (2005:92) indicated that “while we have the land care programme in place, I would make a submission that we need to strengthen this programme so that it resembles those found in New Zealand, Cuba and Australia”. These were the exact words of the former chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture debating the MEC’s budget speech. This debate reflects lessons learnt. However, these expressions can only be traced in a shelved committee report (other than in House resolutions).
The study has also shown that some systems were learned. However, implementation back home was a challenge. While there might have been a slight possibility to create systems, there were challenges that could have impeded progress thereto. For example, 
“(T)he Speaker closed doors for opposition commentary”. MPL, DA. 
“Continuity of members could have been important given the oomph of the then chairpersons”. MPL, UDM. 
It was further indicated that deepening of individual knowledge was given priority other than implementation of systems learned. On the other hand, MPL, ANC said “MPLs had little knowledge…”. The possibilities of implementation were thus limited, given that knowledge and expertise were lacking.
While knowledge acquisition is an appreciated factor, it could have assisted Limpopo Legislature to come up with or improve oversight systems. However, the institution did not benefit from this.
4.3.3.2	Impact of resolutions on service delivery
Committees are expected to produce reports upon return from study tours. Committee coordinators are responsible for compiling such reports for tabling, consideration and adoption by committee members. Thereafter, such reports will be referred to House Proceedings for announcement, tabling and consideration by the House. Once reports are considered and adopted by the House, they should be debated and resolutions thereof should be forwarded to respective departments or implementing agents for implementation.
The study established that of the 11 study tours in question, only five reports were considered and adopted by committees whereas two of those adopted reports were tabled and adopted by the House. One of the latter reports had its resolutions implemented by the department, thus resulting in a positive impact on ZZ2 farm (ZZ2, as previously mentioned is a larger farm situated in Limpopo around Louis Trichardt and is a larger producer and exporter of tomatoes in the country)   regarding organic farming. It is important, however, to indicate that the two adopted reports (namely Agriculture 2005 and 2008) were never debated by the House. The importance of debating reports in the House is to influence House resolutions and inform and advise departments to take appropriate actions. If reports were not considered and adopted at a committee level, they could not reach the House and resolutions could never have emanated from such reports.
Lack of House resolutions cannot be a scapegoat for poor service delivery. Bureaucrats are employed to render services in the provincial government. This means that whether monitored or not, it is a duty they are obliged to carry out. The legislature, on the other hand, has a mandate to oversee the provincial executive departments. Effectiveness of both the two arms of government remained questionable. 
“Poor service delivery is not because of lack of services or knowledge, but unwillingness of administrators”. MPL, UDM.
“Behaviours of [a] political party in government and outside government must merge ... This would therefore establish a clear mandate between legislators and executive on matters of accountability”. CC2.
	Cooperative governance requires all spheres and arms of government to work together. This cooperation should be extended to professional interpersonal relationships in employment settings. Informed by this, the study revealed that there was a lack of cooperation between committee members and committee support staff. CC6 said “members were supposed to be workshopped on the roles of support staff ... Instead, members undermined the knowledge of bureaucrats...”. In fact, cooperation could have assisted oversight and its practice immensely, because provincial departments could have improved their performance through the pressure that could have resulted from oversight systems. Instead, provincial departments relaxed in their execution of duties and thus causing delivery of services to suffer. This therefore means that oversight results, especially from study tours, yielded minimal outcomes.
4.4	DATA ANALYSIS 

Due to the exploratory nature of the study, the researcher developed categories from data, informed by and comprising key expressed ideas, inclusive of differences, similarities, variations, relationships and their relative importance to the context of the study. The analysis of emerging themes has been grouped into a framework consisting of four categories; namely,
Category A: level of executive engagement by committees; 
Category B: tools needed for committee work; 
Category C: obstruction of committee work; and 
Category D: expected outcomes of oversight. 
These categories facilitate analysis and interpretation of data from the findings as presented in Section 3. This framework is now applied to interview data and documents, with the objective of further exploring the effect of study tours.
4.4.1	Analysis of interviews through framework application
a)	Level of executive engagement by committees:  The results show a strong expression of ineffectiveness in the way committees engage the work of the executive. The expression of “no objectivity, no constructive engagement, no involvement, no punishment, no substantiality, and  rubberstamping” reflects such ineffectiveness during accountability by the executive. This can therefore suggest that both the form and the level of engagement are ineffective. This can also be aligned to what Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson (2004:9) regarded as the conditions for the feasibility of separation of powers, that “there need to be a certain degree of co-operation between the branches in policy making whereby the legislature must have some capacity to monitor the executive …”
There is a direct connection between the form of engagement and the level of engagement within the category. In other words, themes like ‘no objectivity and no constructive engagement’ result in ‘rubberstamping’ by committees during accountability by the executive. Rubberstamping is described in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004:1256) as “an instance of automatic approval given without proper consideration”. An act of rubberstamping has been highly prevalent when executive departments present their budgets to legislature’s committees – expressed in this research by MPLs and focus group participants. There is also a direct link between ‘improper needs analysis’ by committees and ‘business as usual’ within executive departments. This implies that if study tours as best institutional practices are not informed by the need, this in itself can impact negatively on the way in which committees engage the departments. In a nutshell, for study tours to impact meaningfully on committee work, a need analysis should be conducted so as to identify and address issues that need committees to excel in their oversight function. This will not only assist committees, but departments too so as to improve their performance other than doing ‘business as usual’. 
There is a relationship between committees’ engagement of the executive (category A) and obstruction of committee work (category C). This is reflected in the following themes which appear in both categories: no objectivity, lack of commitment, no constructive engagement, improper needs analysis, to cite but a few. In essence, this highlights that things that obstruct committee work are the same things that make it harder for committees to substantially engage the departments.
While there is a strong expression of ineffectiveness within this category, the following variations were detected particularly in the level of engagement: ‘action taken against the executive’ or ‘dismissal of accounting officers’; ‘never subpoenaed the executive’ and ‘critical interrogation’. Equally, there is a direct contrast between ‘actions taken against the executive by committees’ and ‘no punishment, never subpoenaed the executive and critical interrogation’. The contrast might be as a result of interviewees’ experiences in different committees.
b)	Tools needed for committee work: There is a high expression of a need for both collective intellectual capacity and individual intellectual capacity for the oversight function. Collective intellectual capacity is expressed in themes like specialized skills, leadership and common understanding of oversight while individual intellectual capacity is expressed in themes such as knowledge acquisition, and level of understanding oversight. Both MPLs and focus group participants pointed fingers at each other regarding the need for capacities as aforementioned. In other words, MPLs felt that support staff needed specialized skills to carry out committee work, while focus group members felt that MPLs needed to be educated to have a common understanding of oversight. This implies that both committee members and support staff’s level of education and understanding of oversight mandate are determining factors of successful execution of oversight.
Institutional memory has been identified as an important element to ensure that knowledge gained from study tours is effectively utilized over time during oversight over the executive departments. Continuity of members has been identified as an advantage towards improvement in the performance of oversight. This therefore links the two themes; i.e., institutional memory and continuity of members, as elements that have a serious impact on oversight.
A strong connection has been detected among the following (Figure 1):				

Figure 1 : Governance at macro-level. The figure reflects separation of powers within the provincial setting (and within the context of this study) and how activities of the legislature and executive are linked.
							

Figure 2: Governance at micro-level. The figure outlines the importance of leadership in shaping activities of both the legislature and the executive.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship among themes in category B at a macro level. It therefore reflects that leadership informs the political agenda whereas the political agenda should also guide those in leadership positions. Leadership should equally guide both the legislature and the executive so that, eventually, neither deviates from the political agenda as their guiding framework. In other words, while separation of powers is a doctrine outlining how the two must function, the bottom line is for both to serve the electorates and ensure that they have a better life.
Figure 2 is an illustration of figure 1 in operation, i.e. at micro-level.  It provides coordination among themes. It is a fact that political leadership as outlined in figure 1 guides both the legislature and the executive. What figure 2 outlines is that it is the very same leadership that should guide its members in the legislature to attend training and workshops. The attendance thereof would assist with knowledge acquisition, which would help committee members to better understand the oversight function. The political agenda should (through policies) guide the strategic drive of executive departments. Such a direction will lead to service delivery which will consequently result in quality work. Equally, the level of effectiveness by committees, including viable opposition, may exert pressure on the departments to deliver on their strategies. When the departments know what is expected of them by the legislature, which in this case is quality work, and execute it, there will be cooperation and understanding amongst these two arms of state. In other words, cooperative governance will be the ultimate goal.
There is a close link between tools needed for committee work and expected outcomes of oversight (categories B and D). For example, committees need to do quality work to expect quality work from the departments. Again, the level of effectiveness in the performance of the oversight function will bring about implementation of policies by departments, turnaround in departments and change/transformation. In short, there will be a huge improvement.
Collaborative oversight has been detected as a variation within this category as it involves oversight by both the Legislature and the local sphere of government and would therefore within the context of this study not be examined.
c) Obstruction to committee work: The category consists of conscious and unconscious factors that impede oversight. Key expressed ideas point to the lack of political will by committee members (e.g., no constructive engagement, lack of commitment, non-tabling of reports, etc.) and the manner of dealing with committee work (e.g. blurred oversight, improper needs analysis, undermining support staff). Institutional arrangements like a weak oversight model, political systems and separation of powers are also regarded as key factors undermining and thus obstructing committee work. 
There are similarities between conscious and unconscious factors within the category. Incapacity, or limited capacity, of MPLs and lack of knowledge, or little knowledge, of MPLs, for example, might mean that political education or potential educational standard is necessary to ensure that committees have a common understanding of oversight. Political education as a product of political agenda should be provided by leadership to ensure that the function of oversight has political value. Furthermore, a certain prescribed educational standard (for example, matric plus two year tertiary qualification) will enhance the extent to which committee members will interact with the executive and submitted documents. This implies that when committees understand the value of oversight in a political sense, they will change their attitude and approach towards oversight and will therefore revive their political will. In fact, the connection that emerged from this category confirmed the mathematical principle that if A=B, B=C therefore A=C. Thus, tools needed for committees’ engagement with the executive for which committees expect certain outcomes after having utilized such tools are actually obstructed by committees themselves. This therefore means that there is a need for committees to deal with expressed ideas in this category (c) so as to enhance their engagement with the executive (a) and effect tools needed for their work (b) so as to have valuable expected outcomes of oversight (d). In short, committees should not expect valuable outcomes of oversight if they fail to deal with elements obstructing the function of oversight.
Study tours are supposed to be the mechanism to enrich committees’ capacities in their performance of oversight; however, non-critical learning, shopping and fabricated reports render study tours meaningless. Notwithstanding that non- tabling of, or tabling of just a few, reports is also contributory to rendering study tours meaningless, it reflects ignorance and lack of political direction by committees. This is because the conscious factors alone, with the exception of “limitations on separation of powers and weak oversight model” symbolize that learning or no learning, oversight will remain blurred. Learning is defined by South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary (2004:811) as ‘knowledge acquired by study’. A fabricated report can therefore not be regarded as a product of learning and neither is shopping.  In the light of these factors, if committees were aware of incapacity by some of their members, or lack of skills by staff (just to cite but a few possibilities) and were unable to transform the situation, then there was a nil possibility to coming closer to recognizing, let alone dealing with, such factors.
Although the separation of powers, attitude of the executive and a weak oversight model were detected as concepts that would need engagements at a national scale, the results shows that they reflect an interconnection with other themes within category  C. As reflected in sketch 1 below, committees are not only carrying the heavy burden that they are consciously aware of, but are also torn between institutional arrangements beyond their control and the attitude of the executive.			
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Sketch1. Institutional arrangements which are beyond committees’ control and obstructing committee work			
The sketch above is a reflection of how separation of powers contributed to the weak oversight model which South Africa finds itself in. Legislatures in the country follow what National Parliament does (in terms of mandates as required by the Constitution). However, Limpopo Legislature finds itself torn between what it is expected to do (mandate of oversight) and how it is expected to do it (on the executive given their attitude). This therefore means that separation of powers is an ever flowing tear by the legislature as it impedes the legislature to carry out its oversight function effectively. Equally, it brings about a heavy burden on the legislature’s committees; something which they are fully aware of (conscious factors) but cannot do anything about it. On the other side, what committees are not aware of (unconscious factors which are light in character) is that their lack of knowledge, skills just to cite but few, also obstruct committee work. Until such time that they are known to be important to be addressed, committee work, particularly oversight will be obstructed.
This is in line with the literature that revealed that oversight, even more than lawmaking, puts the legislature into an adversarial relationship with at least some portion of the executive branch (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999).
d)	Expected outcomes of oversight: The results show a strong expression of change or turnaround in the performance of executive departments. Expressions like huge improvement, change, direction to service delivery, and turnaround in provincial departments, are similar and related as they move the performance of the departments from business as usual to excellence in service delivery. The results show the relationship as reflected in table 2. 	
Table 2:  The relationship between oversight by committees and service delivery by departments
Performance	Committees (oversight)	Departments
LOW	A = no objectivity, not factual, no involvement, no constructive engagement, etc.	B = Extreme opposite of D
HIGH	C = Extreme opposite of A	D = outstanding performance, turnaround in provincial departments, direction to service delivery, huge improvement, quality work, etc

	Table 2 is a reflection of an outcome in the performance of committees’ oversight function towards the executive. It shows that a low performance by committees is a causal factor to low performance by the departments while a high performance will yield positive outcomes. In other words, performance by the department is to some extent dependent upon performance by committees.
4.4.2	Documentary analysis through framework application
In order to further investigate the applicability of the literature to the current case, the study used committee reports on study tours by legislature committees to fathom the lessons learnt from study tours and consider whether such lessons were implemented or not. The study shows that committees undertook national, regional and international study tours as a means to enrich their capacity on oversight. 
Table 1 illustrated that six international, three regional and two national study tours were undertaken by committees, thus making a total of 11 study tours. Of the 11 study tours, only five reports were considered and adopted by committees, whereas two of those adopted reports were tabled and adopted by the House. One of the latter reports had its committee recommendations, not House resolutions, implemented by the department, thus resulting in a positive impact on ZZ2 farm regarding organic farming. It is, however, important to indicate that one of the two adopted reports (namely Agriculture 2005) was never debated by the House (no indication of such debates occurs in the Hansards of 2005). The positive impact on ZZ2 farm can be seen as action in advance by the Department of Agriculture. In other words, despite the fact that the committee report was neither tabled nor debated in the House, the department took committee recommendations seriously by implementing them, thus resulting in positive outcomes. The importance of debating reports in the House is to influence House resolutions and inform and advise departments to take appropriate actions. While SCOPA was unable to either adopt reports at committee level or in the House, it managed through practice to ensure that lessons learnt from Malawi and Australia were implemented.
The study shows that of the eleven study tours undertaken, eight reflect that lessons similar to intended purpose were drawn whereas three study tours resulted in lessons other than the intended ones. Though in some study tours lessons were drawn, reports regarding such lessons never reached the House for debates so that resolutions thereof could be implemented by respective departments. This therefore rendered the lessons drawn from the tours to be meaningless. Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau (2006:39) advised that the effectiveness of oversight depends on the quality of reports generated through study tours or conversing with people, the level of preparation of committee members and the pursuance of issues raised. This was partially the case with Limpopo Legislature. In fact, the non-utilisation of and partial utilisation of lessons drawn from study tours is equivalent to what James and Lodge (2003:188) referred to as policy transfer errors, i.e. the uninformed, incomplete and inappropriate policy transfers.
The inability of committees to fruitfully utilise lessons learned confirms the information that the researcher gathered in some informal interviews with staff members and former legislators regarding the significance of study tours and their contribution to oversight in Limpopo Legislature, where it was indicated that strengthening oversight capabilities may not be necessary if the institution was concentrating on staff retention of the supporting committees. They believed that committee members were employed on five year contracts and most staff members on permanent basis. It is therefore imperative to have staff members recognized as part of the institutional memory. Some of staff members believed that most study tours were some form of ‘fulfillment of fantasies by fanatic members’ to visit overseas countries before the end of their tenures; not that they are linked to oversight in any way. Even Stapenhurst et al. (2005:10-19) maintained that effective legislative oversight rely on,  amongst others, “effective research staff with knowledge of public administration and accountability, effective chairing, committee members with relevant experience and power to report conclusions, suggest improvements and make follow ups”.
HANSARDS published from 2004-2009 were also scrutinized as part of the research project. The study revealed that HANSARDS available at Limpopo Legislature were ranging from 2002 to 2005 and then from 2009 onwards, thus leaving a gap from 2006 to 2008. It is worth noting that though most committee reports from study tours were never debated in the House, committee reports on departmental budgets were debated at length. The Third Legislature of the Limpopo Province (2005:92) indicated that “while we have the land care programme in place, I would make a submission that we need to strengthen this programme so that it resembles those found in New Zealand, Cuba and Australia”. These were the exact words of the former chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, debating the MEC’s budget speech. As previously indicated, the debate in the House should inform resolutions to departments. On the other hand, the verbal expression of what was learnt from study tours – without necessarily tabling committee reports – becomes meaningless to those who were not privileged to be on such tours.
It is the responsibility of the chairperson of the committee through the advice of committee secretaries to ensure that committee reports are considered and adopted by the committee and thereafter tabled before the House for adoption. After adoption by the House, resolutions or recommendations should be forwarded to departments for implementation. It is the responsibility of the committee through the advice of committee secretaries, researchers and staff in the House Proceedings Section to make follow-ups on House resolutions more especially during oversight. Polsby (in Nakamura, 2008) advised that for legislatures to serve effectively as instruments for accountability requires not only resources but greater institutional capacities like the need to have political and administrative staff that are experts in the field of advice and operational duties.
The study shows that both chairpersons and committee support staff (secretaries and researchers) failed in their responsibilities to ensure that lessons from study tours were meaningfully effected. This failure might be attributed to most of the themes in category C above (obstruction to committee work).
4.3	CONCLUSION

This chapter has confirmed through interviews conducted and documentary analysis that there is a relationship between oversight and study tours. The crux of the matter for the complementarities of both activities lies with political will by politicians who constitute committees. It is therefore incumbent upon the committee members not to lose sight on the purpose of their representation role in the legislature. It could be stressed that committee support staff as appointed officials would always execute their responsibilities when robust leadership is being provided.















SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1	SUMMARY

This study was undertaken in order to establish the contribution that study tours had on oversight function in the Limpopo Legislature and to determine whether provincial executive departments benefited positively from study tours. The findings of the Auditor-General (2002-2008) had revealed that Limpopo provincial departments were not performing to the expected standards. These findings led to most provincial departments in the Limpopo Province receiving qualified reports. The underperformance drew the attention of the media and the opposition parties in the Limpopo Legislature. Committees in the legislature took it upon themselves to ensure that departmental performance was improved. Most committees thus attributed weak departmental performances to ineffective oversight, hence they identified a need advance their oversight function. 
Study tours were projected as tools to enrich committees’ capacity on the oversight function. The purpose of engaging in study tours was believed to be to learn from and compare with counterparts (in and outside the country) on how oversight was carried out, with an aim of transferring the lessons to the Limpopo Legislature. It was assumed that best practices in oversight (acquired through study tours) would facilitate the conduct of oversight; which would ultimately assist those who had been on the tours to engage the departments in a manner that would improve departmental performance. This study was designed to systematically and critically interrogate these assumptions about study tours. The focus was specifically on the Limpopo experience, but the lessons learnt also have likely wider relevance. 
The study therefore sought to establish the importance of study tours, their contribution to policy processes and particularly their link to the oversight function in the legislature. Acknowledging the paucity of previous research and theories to illuminate the link between study tours and the oversight function, the study used the theory of separation of powers to explore the legislative-executive relations. This was done because the function of oversight at the legislature is dependent on the executive showing through its work that oversight is tolerated, if not encouraged, and that the executive will subject itself to being monitored by the legislature. The lack of theory on the specifics of this theme, particularly within the context of the legislature or parliament prompted the study to seek answers on questions on the study tours-oversight relations. The study therefore sought to answer the question as to whether study tours contributed to the effectiveness of oversight function that was performed in the Limpopo Legislature, as perceived by committee members and as evidenced in the 2004-2009 term.
The study was conducted in the Limpopo Legislature, using a purposive research design to explore the contribution that study tours had on oversight in the legislature. Data was obtained through semi-structured face-to-face interviews and documentary analysis. The study was qualitative in nature and utilised qualitative data analysis and interpretation to analyse the research findings. 
The study established that out of eleven study tours undertaken, only two were shown to have achieved their purposes. Although this specific research evidence had not previously been available, the phenomenon had been sufficiently evident to motivate this study. The same impressionistic information that had led to this study had been available to the Limpopo legislature generally. It had not, however, impelled the legislature to either assess or review the impact or contribution of these study tours on the oversight function. 
In the discussion below, I summarise the research presented in the study, consider the implications of the results, give conclusions, discuss the study’s limitations and provide recommendations and suggestions for future research.
5.2	FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

The findings are question specific and are summarised in relation to the respective research questions. These pertained to the purpose of oversight and how it was understood by members in the Limpopo Legislature; the purpose of study tours and how they were construed by members in the Limpopo Legislature; and the influence of study tours on the oversight function and how members in the Limpopo Legislature viewed the oversight function. The section synthesises the findings with a view to answering the research questions.
5.2.1	Understanding what oversight entails
The study has shown that lack of common understanding of oversight helped prohibit a robust exercise of oversight. In addition, some members of the committees in the Limpopo Legislature did not make it their business to fully understand their roles in committees and the legislature in general. As the findings suggest, lack of skills and knowledge contributed to lack of the understanding of committee work and in particular, oversight. The findings highlighted a need to have collective and individual capacity, institutional memory and leadership as proper tools for effective oversight.
Both the study and the literature have shown that most politicians did not occupy political positions based on their educational background (Nakamura, 2008). While the literature has shown the importance of acquiring specific qualifications for specific posts (in this case, the need to be a lawyer to deal with laws, as suggested by Nakamura, 2008); this study found the need for capacity to execute committee work for both committee support staff and committee members. That is, expert knowledge for support staff was perceived  by MPLs to be essential in advising committees, whereas standard education was perceived by support staff to be relevant for politicians (committee members) to understanding the function of oversight. Standard education and expert knowledge were perceived to be complementing each other during oversight. 
While experiences such as that of SCOPA in the Limpopo Legislature proved to have enhanced oversight in a small way (i.e. through dedication by a few), it is important to have legislation regulating the undertaking of study tours at the Legislature. This is because an existing policy on committees’ excursions (Policy on Study tours, 2005) was silent about the pertinent issues regarding the undertaking of study tours. For example, the existing policy did not summarise the roles and responsibilities of individuals involved in the policy and did not provide for the applicability and scope – which describe the general organisational mission and values and link them to the provisions of the policy. It is therefore important that the national government through Parliament should develop a framework regarding study tours undertaken – and in particular concerning processes for the application of learning experiences and their exchange amongst legislatures – within the country and amongst provinces so that they will be geared towards achieving the South African agenda of effective, democratic governance. In other words, there is a need for integration of activities within the South African legislatures in relation to study tours. For example, a study tour undertaken by North West Provincial Legislature should be seen to be also benefiting Limpopo Legislature and other provincial legislatures, and vice versa. 
Lack of understanding ‘political agenda’, as the study has shown, has to a minimal extent contributed to factors obstructing successful oversight. This lack of understanding has been prevalent in the way separation of powers has been either perceived or understood; which consequently, affected the exercise of oversight.  Separation of powers has been manipulated by those in the executive to put their stamp on those in the legislature. As the study has uncovered, senior politicians occupying executive posts used their political party positions to undermine politicians in the legislature. This was because when politicians in the executive were required to account to the legislature – in committee meetings – some did not respond positively to such a requirement; i.e. they either did not arrive at all or pitched but did not respond adequately to questions asked by committees. In the process, oversight became blurred.
5.2.2	The reason for undertaking study tours in the Limpopo Legislature 
The main aim for undertaking study tours was identified by both the literature and the study as for lesson-drawing purposes. The study has however shown that more often than not, a thorough needs analysis was not carried out prior undertaking the study tours. For example, there was an absence of prior research on the type of the political system of the host country and issues to be learnt in that country.
The study uncovered that there were no empowerment programs offered prior to undertaking the study tours. The study worked with the assumption that such programs could have facilitated meaningful engagements during study tours. Once again, the capacity of members was raised as crucial to attaining purposes of study tours.
5.2.3	The influence of the study tours on oversight in the Limpopo Legislature
The research project established that of all committees that had been on study tours, only one committee; i.e., SCOPA, managed to develop its own oversight system emerging from these tours. In essence, this reflected lack of commitment, lack of political will and dedication on the part of other committees that engaged in study tours. Consequently, knowledge acquisition or lesson drawing was immensely affected.
The study found that reports from study tours were not given the necessary attention. Some reports were neither considered nor adopted by the respective committees linked to the touring missions, and therefore did not reach the House for consideration, debate, adoption and referral to the respective provincial departments. Some of the reports were considered at committee level, but were never tabled in the House. Other reports were adopted by the House and referred to relevant provincial departments and thus resulted in positive impact on service delivery. Some Hansards were missing and possible House deliberations and resolutions could not be tracked in full detail. In short, the research project revealed ignorance, and a lack of dedication and political will on the side of committee members, including committee support staff.
Legislative oversight cannot be divorced from accountability by the executive; i. e. there is no way one can speak about legislative oversight without aligning it to the executive performance. The Limpopo Legislature has undertaken a number of study tours, as outlined in chapter 4. While the main aim of these study tours was to learn and enrich on oversight capacities, the findings did not reveal how the countries visited had dealt with their executive-legislative relations. It was thus difficult to detect the extent to which the separation of powers was handled in such countries. In this vein, had the study tour findings revealed how the countries visited had been able to handle their legislative-executive relations or separation of powers, this could have assisted committees in the Limpopo Legislature to improve on their oversight over the provincial executive departments. Committees could have transferred lessons in an appropriate manner, as suggested by Rose’s (2001) theory of lesson drawing. Equally, they could have avoided what the literature referred to as an ‘incomplete transfer of policies’ (James and Lodge, 2003:188). This could have supported one of the values maintained by Limpopo Legislature as an institution ‘espoused to commitment to transformation and continuous learning’. It could have also proven beyond doubt that the advice offered by CDG (2000), that study tours should seek to accomplish specific objectives, are adhered to when study tours are undertaken within the legislative context. However, this was not the case in the Limpopo Legislature – as reflected in the findings of this study. 
Most importantly, the study revealed a substantial need for the Limpopo Legislature to put measures in place to assess performance on oversight. It would also be required to review its policy on study tours so that tours will assist in the undertaking, assessment or evaluation of contributions made by study tours to the oversight function in Limpopo. 
General implications of the findings
Duties discharged by committee members and support staff are complementary and key to success within the legislature. Both political and institutional leadership, as well as commitment and dedication by committee members and support staff, are powerful tools towards effective oversight. Lessons from study tours are ‘supplementary’, and not crucial to the effective oversight.
Constant assessment of committee work is necessary to check or evaluate progress on performance on oversight. There must be systems in place to assess performance of committees on oversight. Moreover, there is an immediate need to assess the value of study tours as tools believed to be oversight-enhancement measures. Both the effectiveness and impact of study tours need to be subjected to systematic checks.
Theoretical implications
Questions raised in the study were able to challenge the application of separation of powers within the South African political context and Limpopo in particular, as this notion is manifested in the context of study tours undertaken on the assumption of improvement of oversight by the Legislature of the Executive. The questions highlighted that the theory of separation of powers can be applied in principle, but it is realistically impossible to manage, as evidenced in the lack of capacitation for improved oversight courtesy of the presumed learning that is to be achieved through study tours.
The findings also confirmed that the lessons from study tours will only enrich oversight capacity if it is matched by dedication of committees members. This is consistent with what has been indicated by Stapenhurst et. al (2005); Shepard (in Pelizzo et al., 2004) and Born (2006). Furthermore, the research confirmed that the quality of reports generated from study tours can assist oversight immensely if given the necessary attention, as has been noted by Corder, Jagwanath and Soltau (2006) and the CDG (2000).
These findings therefore highlighted how important instruments such as study tours were carelessly utilised within the Limpopo Legislature, something which other studies have been unable to portray. Though financial implications of the study tours were beyond the scope of the current study, the findings indirectly highlighted that if study tours did not have a positive impact on oversight, value for money was obviously not being realised. In an extension of the contributions of preceding research insights, the study also highlighted that the contribution of study tours to oversight had never before been evaluated in the Limpopo Legislature. This was due to the lack of systems in the legislature to monitor and measure performance on oversight functions against the tools enhancing it. 
Policy implications
The study thus showed that the Policy on Study Tours (2005) is not making an impact on how study tours should contribute to mandates of the Legislature, and in particular, to oversight. The nature of the institution (the legislature – undertaking lawmaking) requires it to be exemplary in matters like policy review, as they are equivalent in importance to lawmaking or the amendment of such laws. Further, as an oversight body, the Legislature is required to oversee policy implementation by the executive. It should understand and advise on policy matters, hence a need to be exemplary on policy related matters.
5.3   CONCLUSION

From the results of the study, the following conclusions can be drawn:
Firstly, the conclusion is with respect to understanding what oversight entails: It can be concluded that committee work, in particular oversight, is necessary to advance service delivery by departments and should therefore be given the necessary tools to enhance it. Despite numerous study tours undertaken by committees in an effort to enhance oversight, committees were still unable to notice that:
	Leadership is a critical element in any organisation and committees of the legislature should be headed by capable and determined chairpersons. This will not only assist in the achievement of both the vision and mission of the legislature, but it will assist in fulfilling the Constitutional requirements as set out in Section 114 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
	Capacity, also for monitoring of the executive via study tour insights, is an important element in the execution of duties and persons in need of it should be dedicated towards acquiring it. While it may be difficult for some people to acknowledge their lack of capacity, it is important for the capacitated to advise the incapacitated so that this weakness can be overcome. Duties in committees should be discharged by people with the capacity to enable oversight to be conducted in a significant manner, thus ensuring common understanding and interpretation of oversight.
	Institutional memory cannot be attributed to individuals alone (or to continuity of members or retention of support staff), but also needs to be linked to proper archiving by the institution. Proper records like Hansards can be useful in reflecting decisions of the House, including decisions that may be linked to insights derived from study tours, and should be kept and organised meticulously.
	The case of the investigation of study tours shows that policies are important for operational activities of an institution. The regular review of policies is therefore necessary for advancement of institutional activities such as oversight.
	The separation of powers poses a serious power challenge in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. Its application remains a challenge, as evidenced in the theory and literature included in this study of study tours at the Limpopo Legislature.
Secondly, the conclusion is with respect to the reason for undertaking study tours in the Limpopo Legislature: The main purpose for undertaking study tours has been identified as lesson-drawing. Despite study tours undertaken at the Legislature, conclusions can be drawn that:
	A needs analysis is a powerful tool in determining the need for a study tour and should not be ignored prior the undertaking of study tours. 
	Committee reports and Hansards are important as they carry recommendations for enactment by executive departments. Non-consideration and non-adoption of such reports (in particular study tour reports), including non-tabling, debate and adoption by the House, is a reflection of lack of political will by committee members.
	Workshops and empowerment programs are necessary for capacity-building. They should therefore be offered prior to study tours so that committees are equipped with knowledge on how to engage with the host country or their counterparts.
	Lesson-drawing is a crucial tool in lesson transfer process and it is important that information collected in the course of study tours is not shelved, but shared.
Lastly, the conclusion is with respect to the influence that study tours had on the oversight function in the Limpopo Legislature. It can therefore be concluded that:
	Lack of political will, ignorance and lack of dedication by committees, including lack of  commitment by support staff, affected the effect which study tours could have had on oversight in the provincial government in Limpopo.
	SCOPA, other than other committees, took its business seriously, hence its effective oversight system.
5.4	RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations are offered in this section on how best study tours can be utilised to enhance oversight. Recommendations for future research follow.
5.4.1    Recommendations for utilisation of study tours as instruments for oversight capacity-      enrichment 
Based on the conclusions, the recommendations below might assist the Limpopo Legislature to review how study tours are undertaken, and to relate the purposes of the tours to the anticipated impact or contribution of such study tours:
	Prior and during the undertaking of study tours, it is imperative for committee members to internalise the role played by the legislature in relation to the executive. Insights into this role will enable members to understand their roles and responsibilities in respective committees; and consequently, set out with clarity on what they are expected to learn or acquire during study tours in respect of oversight.
	The understanding of how committees function would require a certain level of education among role players in committees. Education thereof should be offered in the form of workshops or courses which are relevant to topics under study. This understanding of mandate and education level should therefore be assimilated, even during study tours. This will help merge lessons emerging from these study tours with the current practices, or will help improve on the current practices.
	While committee members seem to have an understanding of what oversight is, key to this function is the common understanding and interpretation of what oversight is meant to achieve. The understanding thereof will assist members to empower themselves internally – within the institution (by enhancing their skills, reading documents, dedicating themselves and showing political will). This empowerment will be a crucial element as it would help determine the relevant lessons to be drawn during study tours.
	Study tours are regarded as lesson drawing practices. However, it is necessary that prior to undertaking study tours, a thorough needs analysis has to be carried out so that study tours will be well informed. Committee members and support staff should be empowered prior such study tours so that whatever is learnt has a chance to yield positive results.
	It takes amongst others skills, courage, meaning, dedication and cooperation to work in committees. These attributes apply to both committee support staff and committee members. They are essential to successful oversight. The attributes could be primary tools towards achieving purposes under which study tours are undertaken and even beyond that; i.e. besides assisting in identification of relevant information for the study tour per se, they may assist one’s ability to sift, weigh and choose information that might be beneficial for future committee work. They may also assist in determining the type of future study tours.
	Information is meant for sharing, not for shelving. Committee reports emerging from study tours should be thoroughly considered in committees and in the House. These reports should be scrutinised and adopted in committee meetings and further debated and considered for adoption in the House. This will allow room for information sharing with those members who could not undertake study tours. If lessons from study tours could be properly shared, this will not only boost oversight per se, but also service delivery in general. In other words, after such lessons are translated into resolutions and forwarded to departments for implementation, service delivery by departments could be enhanced.
	Institutional archiving is important so that records on House debates and resolutions are available and accessible, also with a view to drawing lessons from study tours. Hansards should be properly archived.
	The policy on study tours should be reviewed, with a view to using insights and optimising oversight.
	Leadership is an important driver of any institution and the Limpopo Legislature needs efficient political and administrative leadership so that its institutional arrangements are not weakened. This institution should therefore put measures in place to assess its performance on oversight, and in particular, to assess the impact brought by study tours in the exercise of oversight.
5.4.2 Recommendations for future research
The results of the study suggest the need for further comparable research, potentially in a broader perspective. To date, no literature has been available to link study tours and the oversight function in legislatures. The researcher had no specifically comparable data.
Thus, it will be vital for continual academic learning to explore the experiences of all legislatures in South Africa, especially in relation to the contribution of study tours on their oversight function. Further, there is a need for research on expenditure incurred on study tours versus the impact of such tours to communities that they are intended to serve. 
It is important to also explore the importance of both political and administrative leadership within legislatures in guiding committee mandates on oversight and insights gained from activities such as study tours.
5.6	CONCLUDING REMARKS

Learning experiences derived from the study tours proved overwhelmingly meaningless – the study showed that such lessons were minimally applied, if at all. Therefore study tours of the Limpopo Legislature played a highly constrained and minimal role in enhancing the oversight function. This is a reflection of weak institutional arrangements; i.e., poorly formulated policy on study tour and lack of systems or methods to assess the effectiveness of tools used as a means of enhancing oversight – as has been a case with study tours.
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APPENDIX 2:	FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

the contribution of study tours to oversight in the limpopo legislature
 Focus group discussion: 25 and 27 October 2010

1. INTRODUCTION, WELCOME AND BACKGROUND 

Good (morning/afternoon) and welcome to this session. My name is Martina Manamela and I will be facilitating the session. I am the lead researcher on this project on the contribution of study tours to oversight function in the Limpopo Legislature, and my findings will contribute to my Masters dissertation, which I am doing at Wits University’s Graduate School of Public & Development Management (P&DM).

You have agreed to participate in this research project, and I thank you for taking the time to join our discussion. Everyone here today was recruited into this focus group, because you have been working in the committee section for more than 6 years. You have also undertaken study tours with members during the period 2004-2009.  

I am interested in finding out about your experiences with respect to committees and their mandate, particularly on oversight. I hope that we shall explore how this mandate could be linked to study tours. Further, I hope to learn from you about the range of perceptions you may have with respect to the two concepts of study tours and oversight, and how they may be linked.






2. OUR PROCEDURES IN THE DISCUSSION

Before we begin, let me suggest some guidelines that will make our discussion productive and enjoyable.  
	Please do speak up—but only one person should talk at a time. With your permission, I shall be recording the discussion, because I don’t want to miss any of your comments. If you have trouble hearing any of the comments, please let the group know.  Please also just speak one at a time.
	In the discussion, I will use your names or surname (just the way we address each other in the section). Later in the report, no names will be attached to any comments; i.e. the discussion shall be owned by the group.  Your name will be kept confidential. 
	My role here is to introduce the themes, pose the questions and to listen.  I’ll also be summarizing information as we go along. I will not be actively participating in the conversation, but will only be guiding it.  I want you to feel free to talk to the group and not just to me.  I’ll ask questions about the contribution of study tours to the oversight function during 2004-2009 and am interested in your experiences. Because this is a research project, it is important that you link your comments back to the questions. I’ll move the discussion from one question to the next, and simultaneously try to keep us on track so that we can finish in not more than one hour and thirty minutes. 
	If you need to go to the bathroom, please do so and return as soon as possible. I have arranged for drinking water and a few soft drinks, so please help yourselves and let’s keep the conversation flowing. 
	Sometimes, people in focus groups think of things they want to say after the discussion has moved on to other questions. If you would like to add to your comments when we close the discussion, or afterwards, I will be around to talk to  you. 
	Before you leave the boardroom, please sign this form as part of your consent to voluntarily participate in the discussion.
	Any questions before we begin?
To start our discussion, please share with me your perspectives on the purpose of oversight. How would you say it is understood by members of the Limpopo Legislature? And, I shall appreciate it if you could specifically focus on experiences and observations for theperiod, 2004-2009. 
Prompts and checks on the discussion:
How effective, in your opinion, were committees in carrying out their oversight function? Please, share your experiences through the use of examples and illustrations.
Did you observe practices of the executive accounting to the Limpopo Legislature? In what policy areas, for example did this take place? How did they go about doing this? 
Has the executive been accounting to the legislature and its committees? Please elaborate.
In terms of your experiences and observations, were the committees able to influence departmental budgets? If so, at which stage of budgeting did you see this happening?
On a related front, were committees able to scrutinize senior appointments of the executive posts? Any examples that you could use to illustrate?
I note from your observations (if so) that the executive, in some cases, did not account … How did the committees deal with these failures of the executive to account? Have you observed any punitive measures? Have these measures worked? And, please help me understand why some of these measures worked, and others not.
The second theme that is important for this discussion is study tours, the reasons why these tours are undertaken, and how they were construed by members of the Limpopo Legislature. Please, again share your valuable insights with me.
Prompts and checks on the discussion:
Would you say that the study tours were undertaken with the intent to strengthen oversight? Or, were there other considerations that were important too? How do you see the reasons for the study tours being undertaken?
Were the study tours (and one can see them as an institutional practice) mostly informed by a need? If they were, from your vantage point – remember that this is what is important for me in this discussion – what was this need, or what were these needs? Please, if you could use some illustrations in your responses, I shall really appreciate it.
In your experience and observation, were committees empowered on the purpose of study tours, and their relationship with oversight functions? If it was your experience that they were, what form did such empowerment generally take? How effective has this been for you, in your particular committee role/s?
In earlier parts of this research project, I was told that the committees take action to ensure that ‘best practices’ learned during study tours would impact meaningful. In other cases people thought that the committees for some reason or another have not been able to make a difference, based on ‘best practice’.  Do you feel that this study tour learning made a difference to oversight – in any way that you could observe? Or was it ‘business as usual’ after the study tour had taken place?
Regarding the subjects or topics learned from study tours, were there any mechanisms to ensure continuity on the subject learned? How effective were they? Would you link them to oversight?
In the third main part of our discussion, please share with me your insights on how members of the Limpopo Legislature viewed the influence of study tours on oversight functions.
Prompts and checks on the discussion:
On a general level, how many resolutions or recommendations from study tours were implemented by the departments, or how regularly did you see such implementation happening? Please share with me a few of the examples that you can think of.
In some parts of my research people have told me that the implementation of study tour resolutions or recommendations improved service delivery; in other instances they thought the recommendations went to waste … What were your experiences? In which areas of service delivery, if you are familiar with any, did you see such improvement?
To summarise, were there oversight systems or mechanisms learnt from study tours? Can you mention few, to help ensure that we all talk about the same events and processes?
In your experience, have there been improvements in the performance of oversight by committees in the period of 2004-2009? If not, where would you say lies the problem? Do you think that anything could be done about it?
Was knowledge that was gained or shared during study tours used effectively for oversight over the executive departments?  Can you elaborate on that?
Did oversight that result from study tours yield positive outcomes to the electorate?  Can you elaborate on that? Any examples?
Conclusion and wrapping up
In your opinion, were there important questions that I failed to ask, or that the group thus far has not been raising? Do you think we have a sufficient grasp of the roles of oversight and study tours in South African politics in general, and in the politics of the government of Limpopo particularly?
Any other comment on or addition to the overall session?










APPENDIX 3: PERMISSION FOR AN INTERVIEW

Permission for an interview

I............................................................................ hereby give my permission for 
















APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

The following questions strive to assist in answering the primary question, and will thus feature centrally in the interview schedule that will guide the in-depth interviews: 
To the interviewees: Please illuminate all answers with reference to particular committees and your experiences in those committees. Do remember that there are no right or wrong answers. This interview hopes to explore your experiences and your perspectives on the operations of the committees.
What is the purpose of oversight and how was it understood by you, as the former member of the Limpopo Legislature? 
How effective, in your opinion, were committees in carrying out their oversight function? Please use examples / illustrations.
How did the executive account to Limpopo Legislature?
Do you think committees were able to influence departmental budgets? At which stage of budgeting?
Were committees able to scrutinize senior appointments of the executive posts? 
Has the executive been accounting to the legislature and its committees? Please elaborate.
(In case of response that the executive has not accounted) How do committees deal with the failure of the executive to account? Have you observed any punitive measures? How effective have such measures been?
What is the purpose of study tours and how was this purpose construed by you as the former member of the Limpopo Legislature?
Were study tours undertaken with the intent to strengthen oversight?
Were study tours as institutional practice mostly informed by a need? Please elaborate.
Were committees empowered on the purpose of study tours and their relationship with oversight function? If so, what form did such empowerment generally take? How effective has this been for you, in your particular committee role/s?
How did committees ensure that ‘best practices’ learned during study tours impacted meaningfully through oversight?
What were the mechanisms to ensure continuity on the subject learned from study tours?
How did members of the Limpopo Legislature view the influence of study tours on oversight functions?
How many resolutions/recommendations from study tours were implemented by the departments?
How has the implementation of study tour resolutions/recommendations improved service delivery?
What are various oversight systems or mechanisms learnt from study tours?
Has there been any improvement in the performance of oversight by committees in the period of 2004-2009? If not, what was the problem?
Was knowledge that was gained or shared during study tours used effectively for oversight over the executive departments?
Has oversight that resulted from study tours yielded positive outcomes to the electorate? 
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